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INTRODUCTION

In 2002, the Supreme Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe l
held that the nondisclosure provisions of the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Ace (FERPA) did not establish an individual
right enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 More broadly, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion adopted a general rule that
spending legislation that provides federal funding to various
state actors4 does not ordinarily create enforceable rights under
1.
122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002).
2.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
3. Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2279. Section 1983 currently provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuniti€s
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (emphasis added).
4. While Gonzaga University is a private university, both the Washington Court of
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§ 1983 unless Congress demonstrates through clear and
unambiguous evidence that it intends to provide individual
rights against any state actor that accepts federal funding. 5
While previous cases had distinguished between implied right of
action cases, where evidence is required that Congress intended
a private remedy, and § 1983 cases, where a remedy is generally
presumed, the majority found that the two types of cases are
similar in determining whether Congress intended to create a
federal right. 6
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
argued that FERPA's nondisclosure provisions did establish
individual rights enforceable through § 1983. 7 He maintained
that the majority's requirement of clear textual evidence that
Congress intended to establish an individual right
inappropriately adopted the test used in implied right of action
cases about whether Congress intended to establish a private
remedy.8 Furthermore, the majority had acknowledged that this
requirement was unnecessary in § 1983 cases because that
statute allows private enforcement of any statute creating a
distinct federal right, even if there is no private right of action
under the substantive statute. 9 While· the majority opinion
claimed that it was not importing the entire implied right of
action framework into the § 1983 arena, Justice Stevens argued
that the majority's approach effectively did just that and
undermined the "presumptive enforceability of rights under
§ 1983."10
This Article will focus on the impact of Gonzaga in future
§ 1983 cases rather than on whether the Court was correct in
finding that FERPA does not establish individual rights
enforceable under § 1983. While it does not purportedly change
the prevailing three-part enforcement test for § 1983,11 the
Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court determined that the university had "acted
'under color of state law' for purposes of § 1983 when they disclosed respondent's personal
information to state officials in connection with state-law teacher certification
requirements." Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2272 n.1 (citing Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390,
401-02 (Wash. 2001)). The university's petition for certiorari challenged this holding, but
the U.S. Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the "relevant disclosures occurred
under color of state law." [d.
5.
See id. at 2273, 2275 (''We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything
short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under
§ 1983.").
6.
[d. at 2275-76.
7.
[d. at 2280-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. [d. at 2284 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9.
[d. at 2285-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10. [d. at 2285 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-H (1997); Bradford C. Mank,
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Gonzaga decision places a heavy and unnecessary burden of
proof on plaintiffs by requiring unambiguous and explicit
evidence that Congress intended to create an individual right
benefiting a class including the plaintiff.12 While purporting to
examine only whether Congress intended to create an individual
right, the majority in fact blurred the line between rights and
remedies by improperly considering in a § 1983 case whether
Congress intended to create a cause of action. 13 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Gonzaga seriously harmed civil
liberties by undermining the principle that federal statutory
rights are presumptively enforceable through § 1983's express
provision for enforcement of statutory rights. 14 In exceptional
cases, the presumption that all federal rights are enforceable can
be rebutted, but the defendant has the burden of demonstrating
that Congress has specifically foreclosed enforcement under
§ 1983 or that a statute· 'provides comprehensive remedies
incompatible with § 1983. 15 By blurring the line between rights
and remedies, the majority effectively shifted the burden of proof
from the defendant to the plaintiff to demonstrate that § 1983
may be used to enforce and provide a remedy for a federal
statutory right. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Gonzaga represents the culmination of his efforts since his 1981
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman 16 decision to
bolster states' rights by restricting suits seeking to enforce
federal statutory rights through § 1983, especially suits by
individuals based on spending clause statutes in which states
accept federal aid in return for accepting certain obligations. 17
The Gonzaga case purports to clarify when federal statutory
rights may be enforced by § 1983. However, the majority opinion
in fact does not clarify how courts should determine what is
"clear" and "unambiguous" evidence of congressional intent to

Using § 1983 to Enforce Title VI's Section 602 Regulations, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 33233 (2001) [hereinafter Mank, Using § 1983] (summarizing the three-part test).
12. Refer to notes 287-90 infra and accompanying text (arguing that the burden
should have been placed on the defendant).
13. Refer to note 290 infra and accompanying text (noting the blurred distinction
between right and remedy under Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis).
14. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990) (distinguishing the
inquiry under § 1983 express enforcement provisions from that involved in implied rights
of action cases). Refer to notes 432-35 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508. Refer to note 137 infra and accompanying text
(discussing the "strong presumption in favor of using § 1983 to enforce statutory rights").
16. 451 U.S. 1,31-32 (1981).
17. Refer to· Part IV.A infra (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's further
endorsement of the restrictive approach in the Gonzaga opinion).

HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1420 2002-2003

2003]

GONZAGA UNIVERSITY V. DOE

1421

establish an individual right. IS It is unclear whether the
majority's test requires a textualist· approach or allows
consideration of legislative history. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Gonzaga largely focused on the "text and
structure" of the FERPA provisions directly at issue,19 although
the Court briefly considered one aspect of the statute's legislative
history.2o While agreeing that whether private individuals may
enforce a federal statute through § 1983 is "a question of
congressional intent," Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter
joined, concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the
"majority's presumption that a right is conferred only if set forth
'unambiguously' in the statute's 'text and structure."'21 The
majority opinion never responded to Justice Breyer's claim that
its approach was textualist. The Gonzaga decision provides little
guidance on which types of evidence may be considered in
determining congressional intent.
This Article makes two specific proposals that are consistent
with a narrow reading of Gonzaga's requirement that § 1983 may
be used to enforce rights only if there is clear and unambiguous
evidence of congressional intent to establish individual rights on
behalf of a class including the plaintiff. First, the Court should
consider legislative history in determining congressional intent.
The Court should consider a statute's legislative history because
it often contains important evidence regarding congressional
intent or purpose. 22 A textualist approach is likely to
underestimate those instances where Congress really intends to
establish an individual right. While Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion primarily addressed the "text and structure" of
the FERPA provisions directly at issue, the Gonzaga decision
never explicitly stated that clear and unambiguous evidence of
congressional intent to establish an individual right must be
found in the statute's text alone. Because examination of a wide
range of evidence is more likely to reveal Congress's intent in
enacting a statute, courts should look more broadly at the entire
statutory context and the statute's legislative history to
determine whether Congress intended to benefit a class that
includes the plaintiff and whether the right claimed by the

18.
Refer to notes 270-73 infra and accompanying text (discussing the Gonzaga
requirement of "clear" and "unambiguous" evidence).
19.
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2278 (2002).
20. [d. at 2279.
[d. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 2273, 2278).
21.
22.
Refer to Part VI.C infra (advocating the use of legislative history to determine
whether Congress intended to establish a right under § 1983).
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plaintiff is sufficiently definite to be capable of judicial
enforcement under § 1983. 23
Second, consistent with the Court's decision in Wright v. City
of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 24 the Court
should consider agency regulations in defining the scope of a
right as long as there is sufficient evidence that Congress
intended to establish an individual right. 25 By considering
evidence in a statute's legislative history and administrative
regulations defining the scope of statutory rights, lower courts
are more likely to find Congress's intent than through a
textualist approach. By rejecting textualism, judges can partially
save the enforcement of statutory rights under § 1983 despite the
Gonzaga Court's overly restrictive approach.

II.

PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION: THE SUPREME COURT'S
GROWING EMPHASIS ON CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

In determining whether Congress intended to create a
federal right, the Gonzaga decision adopted the same test for
§ 1983 that has been used in determining whether a private right
of action can be implied from a particular statute. 26 Even so, the
majority acknowledged a difference between the two types of
suits: plaintiffs asserting an implied private right of action must
show that Congress intended to establish a private cause of
action for a class including them, but § 1983 plaintiffs do not
have to show congressional intent to establish a remedy under
the statute because § 1983 has already established a remedy.27
However, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that the Court
had in fact inappropriately applied the standard for whether
Congress intended to establish a cause of action in the § 1983
context. 28 Before discussing § 1983, it will be helpful to first
discuss implied private rights of action.

23. Refer to notes 418-26 infra and accompanying text (suggesting that judges may
miss congressional intent absent an examination of the legislative history surrounding
the statute in question).
24.
25.

479 U.S. 418, 430-32 (1987).

Refer to Part V.C infra (finding room for regulations to explicate or fill in the
details of a statute and thereby to broadly evince congressional intent to create an
individual right).
26.
Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2275 (declaring that, because implied right of action
cases and § 1983 cases are not separate and distinct, "our implied right of action cases
should guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under
§ 1983").

27.
28.

[d. at 2276.
[d. at 2284-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Before 1964, the Supreme Court generally required explicit
statutory authorization for lawsuits and rarely recognized an
implied cause of action. 29 However, in 1964, the Supreme Court in
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak 30 acknowledged an implied private right of
action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEC Act).
From 1964 until 1975, the Supreme Court and lower courts found
31
implied private causes of action under several statutes.
In 1975, the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash 32 announced a
four-part test for deciding whether a private remedy is implicit in
a statute:
(1) is the plaintiff part of a class that the statute intends to
provide special status to or benefits?;
(2) is there implicit or explicit evidence that Congress
intended to create or deny the proposed private right of
action?;
(3) is such a private right of action consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff?; and
(4) is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law and, thus, in an area where a federal cause of action
would intrude on important state concernst3

29.
See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732-35 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(discussing the early history of Supreme Court decisions allowing or denying private
rights of action); Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under
§ 1983: The Supreme Court's Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 294 (1996) (same); Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause of
Action Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice
Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25-26 (1999) [hereinafter Mank, Private Cause of
Action] (same); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the
Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864-65 (1996)
(same).
.
30. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
31. E.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 399, 407, 420 (1970) (implying a private
right of action in the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1967); Allen v. State Bd.
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 547-48, 557 (1969) (implying a private right of action in the
Voting Rights Act of 1965); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-01
(1967) (implying a private right of action in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); Key,
supra note 29, at 294-95; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 26 n.155;
Michael A. Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies,
and Realism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1062, 1073-74 (1992) (observing that between 1964 and
1975 the Supreme Court took an expansive approach to private rights of action). But see
Stabile, supra note 29, at 866, 867 & nn.32, 34 (arguing that courts were reluctant before
1975 to imply private rights of action, except perhaps in securities area).
32. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
33. Id. at 78; see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 26-27; Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 354-55; Stabile, supra note 29, at 867 & n.38.
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While the Cort majority may have intended the four-part test to
reduce the number of cases in which courts implied private
causes of action, lower courts used the Cort test to find a private
right of action in many cases, especially by emphasizing whether
such a cause of action would serve the statute's purposes, the
third prong of the test. 34 In 1979, Justice Powell observed: "In the
four years since we decided Cort, no less than 20 decisions by the
Courts of Appeals have implied private actions from federal
statutes."35
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,36 the Supreme Court
recognized an implied right of action for individuals suing
educational institutions under section 901(a) of Title IX of the
1972 Education Act Amendments. 37 However, in his dissenting
opinion in Cannon, Justice Powell argued that the separation of
powers principle prohibited federal judges from engaging in
judicial lawmaking by implying a private right of action to
enforce a statute. 38 He contended that courts should imply a
private right of action only if there is substantial evidence that
Congress intended to allow such a suit. 39 According to Justice
Powell's dissent, under separation of powers principles only the
second prong of the Cort test, whether Congress intended to
authorize a private right of action, should be relevant. 4o
While it has never overruled Cort, in subsequent decisions
the Supreme Court has followed Justice Powell's Cannon dissent
by focusing on the second prong of the Cort test-whether there
is significant evidence that Congress intended to create a private
right of action. 41 For example, in 2001, the Supreme Court in
34. Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 27 & n.159.
35. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 741-42 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(citing cases).
36. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
37.
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680, 688-89; see also id. at 682 n.3, 684 n.4 (quoting 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682); Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 27-28
(summarizing Cannon).
38.
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Key, supra note 29,
at 298; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 31-32; Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 11, at 356.
39.
Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting); Mank, Private Cause of Action,
supra note 29, at 31-32; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 356.
40. Key, supra note 29, at 298-99; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at
31; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 356. Additionally, a second separation of
powers concern arguably relates to the view that only Congress should enact laws limiting
the authority of states because Congress is the only branch in which states are
represented. Key, supra note 29, at 299-300; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 354
n.248.
41.
See, e.g., Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1994)
(focusing on what Congress intended in the absence of an express provision); Suter v.
Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992) (stating that the Cart test puts the burden of proof
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Alexander v. Sandovar held in a five-to-four decision that there
is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. 43 Justice Scalia's majority opinion determined
that neither section 602's language nor subsequent amendments
to Title VI demonstrated congressional intent to establish a
private cause of action to enforce section 602.44 The Court held
that "[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does
Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of
action to enforce regulations promulgated under [section] 602.
We therefore hold that no such right of action exists.,,45 In
Gonzaga, the Court later explained:
We have recognized, for example, that Title VI ... create[s]
individual rights because those statutes are phrased "with
an unmistakable focus on the benefited class.,,46 But even
where a statute is phrased in such explicit rights-creating
terms, a plaintiff suing under an implied right of action still
must show that the statute manifests an intent "to create
not just a private right but also a private remedy.,,47

on plaintiffs to show that Congress intended to establish a private remedy for plaintiffs);
Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989)
(emphasizing that courts should concentrate on evidence of congressional intent in
determining whether to imply a private cause of action); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S.
174, 179 (1988) (indicating that the four factors in Cort are all ultimately concerned with
congressional intent); Key, supra note 29, at 285, 297; see also Mank, Private Cause of
Action, supra note 29, at 31-32, 44-46 (discussing these cases); Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 11, at 356 & n.268 (citing these cases); Stabile, supra note 29, at 868-71
(arguing that the Supreme Court beginning in 1979 began shifting away from the fourpart Cort test to "an exclusive reliance on legislative intent"); Mazzuchi, supra note 31, at
1075-80 (arguing that the Supreme Court since the late 1970s has focused on whether
Congress intended to create a private right of action).
42. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
43. [d. at 278, 293. Section 602 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states in
part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of I§l 2000d of this title with respect to such program or
activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which
shall be consistent with the achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until
approved by the President.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (2000); see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 12
(summarizing section 602).
.
44. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289-93.
45. [d. at 293 (citation omitted).
46. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2275 (2002) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979) (emphasis added». ,
47. [d. at 2275-76 (emphases added) (footnote omitted) (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S.
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As a result of the Court's heavy emphasis on whether there
is clear evidence that Congress intended to establish a right of
action, courts have implied very few rights of action in recent
years. 48 The Court has placed the burden on plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the Cort factors are satisfied. 49 The Court has
acknowledged that evidence of such intent may be implicit in a
statute rather than explicit, although Justice Scalia has
disagreed with the majority and demanded explicit textual
5o
evidence. Additionally, for the first ten years after it decided
Cort, the Supreme Court frequently considered a statute's
legislative history if the text was not clear. 51 Mter Justice Scalia
became an Associate Justice in 1986 and strongly lobbied his
colleagues to adopt a textualist approach to statutory
interpretation,52 the Court has more frequently emphasized
whether there is evidence of intent in the statute's text, although
the Court has never stated that it will not consider evidence from
a statute's legislative history. 53 As a result of the Court's
increasingly narrow intent-based interpretation of implied

at 286).
48. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (observing that the Court rejected claims of implied right of action in nine of
eleven recent cases); Key, supra note 29, at 297; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra
note 29, at 31-32, 44-46; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 353-56; Stabile, supra
note 29, at 868--69, 870 & n.54, 871 (listing lower court decisions denying private rights of
action based on lack of congressional intent); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action,
and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 91 (2001) (noting that a
requirement of clear evidence of congressional intent ensures that few private actions will
be found).
49. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (explaining that Cart places the
burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate Congress's intent to make a private remedy
available); Mank, Private Cause ofAction, supra note 29, at 31 & n.187.
50. Compare Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 (stating that congressional intent to create
a private right of action may be inferred from statutory language or structure or from "the
circumstances of its enactment"), with id. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(insisting that congressional intent should not be inferred based on the "context" of the
legislation after finding "no such indication in either text or legislative history"). See also
Zeigler, supra note 48, at 89-91.
51. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (stating that "the Cart
analysis requires consideration oflegislative history").
52. Refer to notes 384-85 infra and accompanying text (noting Justice Scalia's role
as the leading proponent oftextualism on the Court).
53. E.g., Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527,
533-34 (1989) (concluding "neither the language nor the structure of the Act shows any
congressional intent to provide a private cause of action to enforce federal employees
unions' duty offair representation" and further observing that "Inlothing in the legislative
history. .. has been called to our attention indicating that Congress contemplated"
otherwise); see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 31-32 (discussing
Karahalios ).
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private rights of action, plaintiffs have turned to § 1983 to
vindicate statutory rights that do not contain explicit remedies. 54
III.

SECTION

1983 AND IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION

A. Introduction to § 1983

Section 1983 traces its OrIgIns to the Civil Rights Act of
1871, which Congress enacted to protect the civil rights of
Mrican-Americans against former Confederates who were trying
to reestablish white supremacy in various southern states. 55 The
1871 statute guaranteed only constitutional rights and did not
refer to statutory rights. 56 In 1874, during a comprehensive
revision of existing statutes, Congress added the phrase "and
laws" to section 1 of the Civil Rights Act. 57 There is no legislative
history regarding why Congress made this change, and thus it is
not clear whether Congress intended the addition of the term
"and laws" to alter the meaning of the statute. 58
There has been a long debate over whether and how the
addition of the term "and laws" to the statute changed its
meaning. 59 First, proponents of the "Consistency Theory" contend
that the phrase "and laws" must be read in conjunction with
other provisions in the Civil Rights Act to mean "and laws
providing for equal rights.,,60 Second, advocates of the "No
Modification Theory" suggest that Congress merely intended the
revisions to clarify existing law, but that argument creates
serious problems because it implies that courts should generally
ignore the addition "and laws.,,61 Third, commentators proposing
54. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 353-59 (noting that the standard for
§ 1983 is easier for plaintiffs to meet).
55. Id. at 327 & n.38 (citing the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)); Key, supra note 29, at 303-04; Todd E.
Pettys, The Intended Relationship Between Administrative Regulations and Section 1983's
"Laws," 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 54-61 (1998)).
56. Id. at 327 & n.39 (citing Key, supra note 29, at 304 & n.125 (quoting the original
1871 statute); Pettys, supra note 55, at 57 (noting the original Act said nothing about
rights secured by federal "laws")).
57. Id. at 327 & n.40 (citing Key, supra note 29, at 304-05; Pettys, supra note 55, at
57--60).
58. Id. at 327 & n.41 (citing Key, supra note 29, at 305; Pettys, supra note 55, at
59--60).
59. Id. at 327 & n.43 (citing Key, supra note 29, at 306-13).
60.
Id. at 328 & n.44 (citing Key, supra note 29, at 306-07).
61. Id. at 328 & n.45 (citing Key, supra note 29, at 307-08). Some proponents of the
No Modification Theory contend that the phrase "and laws" should be read as to mean
"and laws providing for equal rights." Id. at 328 n.45 (citing Key, supra note 29, at 308).
Yet that interpretation is logically at odds with their contention that the 1874 revision did
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the "Plain Language Theory" maintain that the plain meaning of
the language "and laws" refers to any federal law or statute. 62
Before 1980, the Supreme Court had only clearly allowed
63
§ 1983 suits in cases alleging violations of constitutional rights.
During the 1960s and 1970s, federal grant-in-aid programs to
states grew significantly, and there was an increasing number of
welfare beneficiaries who received funds through various state
agencies. 64 As a result of both program growth and an increasing
awareness of possible legal avenues of redress, many
beneficiaries began to file § 1983 suits alleging that states had
violated their federal statutory rights under grant-in-aid
statutes. 65 However, because of uncertainties about whether
there was federal jurisdiction to raise statutory claims under
§ 1983, most suits also alleged constitutional violations. 66 During
the 1960s and 1970s, a few Supreme Court decisions suggested in
dicta that a § 1983 claim may be based on the violation of a
statutory right, but the cases were generally decided on
constitutional grounds instead. 67
The Supreme Court in its 1979 decision Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Organization 68 held that there was no
such jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)69 to address
statutory claims that were not based on constitutional rights or

not change the statute at all. [d. (citing Key, supra note 29, at 308).
62.
[d. at 328 & n.46 (citing Key, supra note 29, at 308-13).
63.
[d. at 328 & n.47 (citing Pettys, supra note 55, at 52).
64.
Key, supra note 29, at 314.
65.
[d.
66.
[d. at 314-15 (explaining that pendent jurisdiction could be established by
asserting constitutional claims).
67.
E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974) (stating in dicta that "[ilt is,
of course, true that ... suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance
with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States"); City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966) (stating in dicta that an individual
has cause of action under § 1983 "not only for violations of rights conferred by federal
equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory
rights as well"); see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 328 & n.48 (citing
Edelman and Key, supra note 29, at 313-18).
68.
441 U.S. 600 (1979).
69.
[d. at 603, 616 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (renamed § 1343(a)(3) in 1979».
Section 1343(a)(3) allowed suits for injunctive relief to enforce certain civil rights statutes
and did not require a minimum amount in controversy. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note
11, at 328 n.50 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)). On the other hand, the general federalquestion jurisdiction statute, § 1331(a), at the time required a minimum amount in
controversy of $10,000 and was therefore unavailable to the plaintiffs in Chapman. [d. at
328 n.50 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976); Chapman, 441 U.S. at 606 & n.9). In 1980,
Congress eliminated the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement for 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and, as a result, plaintiffs have generally stopped using § 1343(a)(3). [d. (citing Key, supra
note 29, at 310-12; Pettys, supra note 55, at 63 n.77).
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equal protection statutes. 70 The Court did not decide whether
§ 1983 claims may be based on violations of statutory rights,71
although Justice Stevens's majority opinion suggested that
§ 1983's statutory language "and laws" allowed such claims.72 In
his concurring opinion, Justice White maintained that the plain
meaning of the term "and laws" in § 1983 clearly encompassed all
federal statutory rights. 73 Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion,
which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with
Justice White's argument that § 1983 applied to violations of
statutory rights. 74 Conversely, Justice Powell's concurring
opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
argued there was no support in § 1983's sparse legislative history
that Congress sought to alter the scope of the statute when it
enacted the 1874 revisions. 75 Justice Powell contended that the
phrase "and laws" should be interpreted as "and laws providing
for equal rights.,,76 Additionally, Justice Powell contended that a
broad reading of § 1983 to include enforcement of many federal
statutory rights would upset federalism by drastically enlarging
federa1 judges' role in supervising state programs receiving
federal grant monies absent evidence that Congress wanted
courts to exercise such jurisdiction. 77

70.
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 602-03; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at
328 (summarizing the Court's holding).
71. Neither claim in Chapman met the $10,000 amount in controversy threshold
then in existence for general federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and,
therefore, the Court did not examine whether § 1331 established jurisdiction for statutory
claims under § 1983. Chapman, 441 U.S. at 606 & n.9 (citing the then-current version of
28 U.S.C. § 1331); see also Key, supra note 29, at 311-12; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note
11, at 328; Pettys, supra note 55, at 63. In 1980, Congress eliminated the $10,000 amount
in controversy requirement for 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at
328 & n.50 (citing Federal Question Jurisdiction Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Key, supra note 29, at
310-12; Pettys, supra note 55, at 63 n.77).
72.
See Chapman, 441 U.S. at 610-15; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11,
at 328, 329 & n.53 (citing Chapman; Pettys, supra note 55, at 64 (discussing Justice
Stevens's opinion in Chapman)).
73.
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 649-69 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 329 & n.54 (citing Chapman; Key, supra note 29,
at 318-19; Pettys, supra note 55, at 65-66).
74.
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 674-75 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Using
§ 1983, supra note 11, at 329 & n.57 (citing Chapman; Pettys, supra note 55, at 66 n.92).
75.
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 623-27, 645-46 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 329 & n.55 (citing Chapman; Key, supra note 29, at 31920 (discussing Justice Powell's concurring opinion); Pettys, supra note 55, at 65 (same)).
76.
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 623-27, 645-46 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 329 & n.55 (citing Chapman; Key, supra note 29, at 31920; Pettys, supra note 55, at 65).
77.
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 645 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 11, at 329 & n.56 (citing Chapman; Key, supra note 29, at 320).
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While Chapman did not decide whether § 1983's provision
"and laws" includes suits for violations of statutory rights, the
debate in Justice White's and Justice Powell's concurring
opinions was influential when the Court addressed the problem
one year later.78 Justice Powell was alarmed that allowing suits
to vindicate federal statutory rights through § 1983's jurisdiction
would authorize federal courts to assume broad authority over
numerous state grant-in-aid programs receIvmg federal
funding. 79 Conversely, Justice White argued § 1983 was intended
to protect the intended beneficiaries of federally funded programs
from violations by state officials. 80

B. Statutory Rights and § 1983
Maine v. Thiboutot. 81 In 1980, the Supreme Court in
Thiboutot finally addressed whether § 1983 protected federal
statutory rights. The Court held that the plain meaning of the
term "and laws" in § 1983 referred to federal statutory rights and
allowed private individuals who were beneficiaries of those rights
to bring suit. 82 Justice Brennan's majority opinion acknowledged
that the statute's legislative history was inconclusive,83 but
concluded that the language "and laws" in the text clearly
pertained to all federal statutory rights and not only civil rights
84
statutes.
However, in dissent, repeating his arguments in Chapman,
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, argued that § 1983's origins in the 1871 Civil Rights
Act made it most likely that Congress intended the phrase "and
laws" to apply only to civil rights legislation protecting MricanAmericans from discrimination. 85 Additionally, Justice Powell
1.

78. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 329-30.
79. See Chapman, 441 U.S. at 645 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Mank, Using
§ 1983, supra note 11, at 329 & n.58 (citing Chapman; Key, supra note 29, at 320).
80.
Chapman, 441 U.S. at 671-72 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 329 & n.59 (citing Chapman; Key, supra note 29,
at 318-19; Pettys, supra note 55, at 65-66).
81. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
82. [d. at 4-8; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 330 & n.61 (citing
Thiboutot; Pettys, supra note 55, at 52).
83.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 7; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 330 &
n.62 (citing Thiboutot; Pettys, supra note 55, at 66-67). The majority included Justices
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 11, at 330 n.62 (citing Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 1).
84.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-8; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 330 &
nn.63-64 (citing Thiboutot; Pettys, supra note 55, at 66-67).
85.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 13-18,i9 & n.6, 20-22 (Powell, J., dissenting); Chapman,
441 U.S. at 623-37 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the legislative history of § 1983
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contended that the majority had failed to evaluate the burden
imposed on state and local governments by interpreting § 1983
jurisdiction to include numerous federal statutory rights. 86
Justice Powell was particularly worried that the decision would
give federal courts "unprecedented authority to oversee state
87
actions" in administering federal grant-in-aid programs. Thus,
he contended that the Court's expansion of § 1983 jurisdiction
"creates a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our
federal system.,,88
For proponents of states' rights and limited federal
government, Justice Powell's negative reaction in Thiboutot is
understandable. While states must voluntary accept federal
funds and may not under the Tenth Amendment be coerced into
doing SO,89 it is clear that federal grant-in-aid programs have the
effect of shifting power from the states to the federal government
because states generally cannot afford to turn down federal
largess. 9o Usually, the federal agency providing a grant has the
duty of ensuring a state's compliance with any conditions and
may terminate funding. 91 However, as a practical matter, federal
demonstrates that the phrase "and laws" refers only to civil rights legislation and not
federal statutes in general); see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 330, 331 &
n.65 (citing Thiboutot, Chapman, and Pettys, supra note 55, at 52, 67-68 (discussing
Justice Powell's interpretation of "and laws")).
86.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 11-12, 22-25 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 330, 331 & n.66 (citing Thiboutot; Key, supra note 29, at
323-24; Pettys, supra note 55, at 68).
87.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 22-25, 36-37 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 331 & n.67 (citing Thiboutot; Key, supra note 29, at 32324 (discussing Justice Powell's dissenting opinion)).
88.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 33 (Powell, J., dissenting); Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 11, at 331 & n.68 (citing Thiboutot).
89.' See Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947) (holding
that a grant-in-aid program was not coercive because the state could refuse the grant);
Steward Mach. CO. V. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585-93 (1937) (stating that under the Tenth
Amendment, the federal government may not coerce a state into receiving a grant, but
must allow voluntary choice); Key, supra note 29, at 290-91 (summarizing the Supreme
Court's test for determining whether a federal funding condition is constitutional under
the Tenth Amendment).
90. Key, supra note 29, at 289.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000) (requiring the federal funding agency to establish a
framework for investigating and assessing complaints of discrimination by recipients);
Key, supra note 29, at 292-93 (exploring possible reasons for federal agencies' "lack of
success" in achieving state compliance with federal grant-in-aid funding conditions);
Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 12-13 (discussing the requirement in
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act that a funding agency investigate complaints of
discrimination by state recipients and deny funding if necessary); Edward A. Tomlinson &
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs:
Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 619-23 (1972) (assessing the
steps taken in determining state compliance with federal grant-in-aid requirements and
possible reasons for "less than total success").
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agencies rarely invoke the draconian remedy of terminating
funding to a state found to have violated the conditions because
there are often lengthy procedural hurdles that allow a state to
challenge any proposed termination of funding, and members of
Congress from that state will usually oppose termination of
funding. 92 Instead, federal agencies typically negotiate a
settlement that promises future compliance. 93 Federal agencies
are often more concerned with preserving good relationships with
state administrators and maintaining popular programs than
protecting individual beneficiaries. 94 Furthermore, administrative
remedies often do not provide for individual restitution. 95
Suits under § 1983 by intended beneficiaries of grant-in-aid
programs are threatening to state officials-and indirectly to
federal judges solicitous of their interests-precisely because
such suits might result in far stricter enforcement of the
program's conditions. 96 Furthermore, suits under § 1983 could
allow for individual remedies, including damages against state
officials in their individual or personal capacity,97 although a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity98 and the qualified
92. See, e.g., 42 u.s.c. § 671(a)-(b) (providing procedural protections for state
grant-in-aid recipients); id. § 2000d-1 (same); 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(b)(1)-(3) (providing
procedural protections for recipients in the form of EPA regulations to obtain compliance);
Key, supra note 29, at 292-93 (arguing that agencies are reluctant to terminate aid to
state recipients and face procedural barriers even if they wish to do so); Tomlinson &
Mashaw, supra note 91, at 619-20 (same); see also Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra
note 29, at 21-23 (discussing EPA's reluctance to terminate funding to recipients even if
found guilty of discrimination).
93.
Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 21-23 (explaining the common
agency practice of settling Title VI discrimination complaints with recipients of federal
aid).
94.
Key, supra note 29, at 292-93; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at
23 (discussing the EPA's reluctance to terminate funding to recipients even iffound guilty
of discrimination because the Agency is concerned about terminating funding for
important pollution control projects that benefit the public in general); Tomlinson &
Mashaw, supra note 91, at 619-20.
95.
Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 22-24 (discussing limitations
of administrative remedies under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and advantages of
private lawsuits in providing individual remedies).
96. Key, supra note 29, at 322-24 (positing that Justices Powell and Rehnquist
dissented in Thiboutot because they are "champions of states' rights" and that expansive
§ 1983 jurisdiction would force states to comply with federal mandates).
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) (allowing a § 1983 suit seeking damages
97.
against a state official in her individual or personal capacity, even if she acted in her
official capacity in committing the alleged violation).
98.
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity principle prohibits suits against states in
federal court); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989) (holding that
"States or governmental entities that are considered 'arms of the State' for Eleventh
Amendment purposes" are not persons capable of being sued under § 1983 even if suit is
brought in state court).
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immunity99 enjoyed by many state officials often limits the
remedy to prospective injunctive or declaratory relief. loo Despite
its limitations, Thiboutot promised a new era in which
individuals could enforce federal statutory rights against states
101
through § 1983. For judges concerned with protecting states'
rights against what they perceived as intrusive federal suits, it
became imperative to limit Thiboutot's scope. l02 For the next
twenty-two years, the Court's decisions have vacillated between
broad and narrow readings of Thiboutot.
2. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman. 103 In
Pennhurst, the Supreme Court did not directly address § 1983
but limited the ability of beneficiaries of federal grant-in-aid
programs to bring a private cause of action against states that
had allegedly violated conditions in their grants. Justice-now
Chief Justice-Rehnquist's majority opinion declared that federal
agencies rather than federal courts have the primary role in
enforcing conditions in federal grant-in-aid programs against
states. l04 "In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power,
the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally
imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for
noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to
terminate funds to the State.,,105 The Court held that a private
right of action must be based on "enforceable rights" and that

99. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (holding that a state official
enjoys qualified immunity unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional or legal standard); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982);
Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 516 (10th Cir. 1998); Jensen v. City of
Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998).
100. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1997) (stating that Ex parte
Young remains available where the plaintiff seeks prospective relief for an ongoing
violation of federal law); id. at 293-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (same); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-58 (1908) (holding that suits for
injunctive relief against state officials are allowed even where the Eleventh Amendment
bars suit for damages); Rounds v. Or. State Bd., 166 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar students' claim for declaratory
and injunctive relief against university officials sued in their official capacities); Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 336-38 (discussing the availability of damages, injunctive
relief, and immunities under § 1983); Stephen R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, State
Liability for Environmental Violations: The U.S. Supreme Court's "New" Federalism, 29
ENVTL. L. REP. 10665, 10669 & nn.78-85 (1999) (recognizing that Ex parte Young suits
prevent future violations of federal rights but do not redress past violations, for which
damages typically would be the appropriate remedy).
101.
Key, supra note 29, at 321-24.
102.
[d. at 323-24.
103. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
104.
[d. at 27-28.
105. [d. at 28.

HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1433 2002-2003

1434

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[39:5

mere "precatory" language in a federal statute may not create a
federal right of action. 106
The primary question in Pennhurst was whether there is a
private right of action under § 6010 of the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Ace07 for disabled persons
to sue states that allegedly fail to meet certain requirements for
receiving grants in the statute. lOS Although the so-called patients'
"bill of rights" in the statute says that states should provide
appropriate treatment, services, or housing for the
developmentally disabled, § 6010 does not explicitly mandate
that states must achieve these goals to obtain federal funds,
unlike other sections of the statute that contain detailed rules for
receiving aid. l09 Justice Rehnquist argued that
legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much
in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.
The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily
and knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract.,,110
Accordingly, for conditions in a grant-in-aid statute to be
enforceable against a state, they must be sufficiently clear that
one can assume the state voluntarily and knowingly accepted
them.11l Because § 6010 only suggests treatment standards
rather than mandating detailed conditions, the Court determined
that § 6010 did not create enforceable substantive rights, but
that the patients' "bill of rights" constitutes mere precatory
language suggesting what Congress hoped states would offer. 1l2
Thus, the Court concluded that there is no enforceable private
cause of action under § 6010. 113

106. Id. at 15-22; see also Key, supra note 29, at 300-02; Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 11, at 331.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6000-6083 (2000».
108. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5; see also Key, supra note 29, at 300; Mank, Using
§ 1983, supra note 11, at 331.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6009
(2000)); Courtney G. Joslin, Recognizing a Cause of Action Under Title IX for StudentStudent Sexual Harassment, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 201, 219-20 (1999); Key, supra
note 29, at 300-01; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 331.
110. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
111. Id.; see also Key, supra note 29, at 301-02.
112. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17-20; see also Joslin, supra note 109, at 220; Key, supra
note 29, at 301-02; Mank, Using § 1983, supra notel1, at 331.
113. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 22-28; see also Joslin, supra note 109, at 220; Key, supra
note 29, at 302; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 331.
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After holding there was no implied cause of action, the Court
remanded the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit to decide the issue of whether certain other provisions in
the statute were enforceable under § 1983. 114 In remanding the
case, Justice Rehnquist observed that the law was unclear
regarding whether a § 1983 suit must be grounded on specific
statutory violations or could be based: on 'the failure of a state to
meet goals included in a state written plan required by the
statute, even though these aspirations exceeded the statute's
obligations. u5 Justice Rehnquist strongly implied that a § 1983
suit must be based on the violation df specific statutory rights. U6
His opinion made clear that a beneficiary may not use § 1983 to
enforce conditions in a grant-in-aid statute against a state unless
Congress "speak[s] with a clear voice" and manifests an
"unambiguous" intent to create individually enforceable rights. u7
However, other Justices disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's
suggestion that the Third Circuit should limit any § 1983 suit to
specific rights in the statute. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Blackmun refused to join that portion of Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion because of its "negative attitude" toward the use
of § 1983 to enforce the treatment goals in the statute. us
Dissenting in part, Justice White contended that Thiboutot
established a clear presumption in favor of allowing intended
beneficIaries to enforce federal statutes through § 1983, even
where a federal agency has the authority to terminate funding to
a state for violations of significant conditions. 119 While not
deciding the § 1983 issues on the merits, Pennhurst
demonstrated strong disagreements within the Court about when
beneficiaries of federal grant-in-aid·· programs may challenge
alleged violations by a state through § 1983.

114.

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 27-30; see also Key, supra note 29, at 325; Mank, Using

§ 1983, supra note 11, at 331.

115.

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 27-30; see also Key, supra note 29, at 325; Mank, Using

§ 1983, supra note 11, at 331-32.

116.

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28; see also Key, supra note 29, at 325; Mank, Using

§ 1983, supra note 11, at 332.

117. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 28 & n.21; see Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268,
2273, 2275 (2002) (interpreting Pennhurst to require clear and unambiguous evidence of
congressional intent to confer individual rights before federal funding provisions may
provide grounds for private suit under § 1983).
118. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 32-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); see also Key, supra note 29, at 326; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11,
at 332.
119. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 49-52 (White, J., dissenting in part); see also Key, supra
note 29, at 326; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 332.
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C. The Standard for § 1983 Suits

The Three-Part Test for Which Rights Are Enforceable.
Following Pennhurst, the Supreme Court has sought to explain
which types of federal rights are enforceable under § 1983, and
under what circumstances. In its 1989 decision Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles/ 20 the Court restricted § 1983
suits to the enforcement of specific "federal right[s)" that are
intended for the benefit of a class including the plaintiff and that
are capable of judicial enforcement. 121 Conversely, the Court has
stated that § 1983 may not be used to enforce vaguer benefits or
interests emanating from mere precatory statements in a federal
statute. 122 Thus, the Court mandated that a complaint under
§ 1983 assert the "violation of a federal right, not merely a
violation of federal law.,,123 Additionally, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that Congress intended the statute at issue to
benefit a class including the plaintiff.124 To determine whether a
federal statute establishes a federal right that is enforceable by a
plaintiff through § 1983, the Supreme Court in its 1997 Blessing
v. Freestone decision refined a three-part test it had first used in
Golden State:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in
question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the
statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the
statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation
on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to
the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather
than precatory, terms. 125
1.

If a federal statutory right meets the Blessing / Golden State
three-part test, there is a strong presumption that a plaintiff may
use § 1983 to enforce that right.126
120.
493 u.s. 103 (1989).
121. Id. at 106-07; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 332; Pettys, supra
note 55, at 68.
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 (1990); see also Mank, Using
122.
§ 1983, supra note 11, at 332 & n.81; Pettys, supra note 55, at 68-69.
123.
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citing Golden State, 493 U.S. at
106); see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 332.
124. Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at
332 & n.82, 333; Mazzuchi, supra note 31, at 1095.
125. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (citations omitted); see also Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 11, at 332-33 (summarizing the Court's three-part test for § 1983 rights).
126. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341, 346-47; Wilder, 496 U.S. at 520 ("[Courts) do not
lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for the
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2. Exceptions to the Enforceability of § 1983. However, there
are limited exceptions to the general presumption of
enforceability of federal rights through § 1983. In 1981, the
Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n 127 held that a defendant may show
Congress specifically "foreclosed. a § 1983 remedy," either
expressly or impliedly, . by providing a "comprehensive
enforcement mechanism[]" for protection of a federal right. 128
[The Sea Clammers] Court determined that a § 1983 suit
was [inappropriate] because the two federal environmental
statutes at issue, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act[,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000),] and the Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act, [33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445,]
contained 'unusually elaborate' enforcement mechanisms
that authorized private citizens to bring injunctive actions
after giving sixty days' notice to the [U.S.] Environmental
Protection Agency, the state, and the alleged violator.129
The Sea Clammers Court assumed Congress intended to preclude
§ 1983 suits where a remedial statute provides broad remedies
because a § 1983 suit would allow plaintiffs to circumvent those
remedies. 130 However, there is a heavy burden on the defendant
to prove that a statute's enforcement scheme is so comprehensive
that a court must presume Congress could not have intended to
allow a separate remedy through a § 1983 suit. 13l In Livadas v.
Bradshaw, the Court explained that· "apart from [some]

deprivation of a federally secured right." (quotation marks omitted)); see also Mank, Using
§ 1983, supra note 11, at 333 & n.87.
127.
453 U.S. 1 (1981).
128. Id. at 19-20; Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106 (discussing Sea Clammers and its
test for preclusion of § 1983 suits); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 334-36 (same).
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 335 & n.104 (quoting Sea Clammers, 453
129.
U.S. at 13, 20; citing Lisa L. Frye, Note, Suter v. Artist M. and Statutory Remedies Under
Section 1983: Alteration Without Justification, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1171, 1181-82 (1993);
Michael A. Zwibelman, Comment, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (1998)).
130. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20-21; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 335 &
n.105 (citing Frye, supra note 129, at 1181-82; Zwibelman, supra note 129, at 1468). The
Sea Clammers exception to § 1983 suits addresses only statutory claims. In Smith v.
Robinson, the Court applied a somewhat different analysis in deciding whether a plaintiff
may bring a constitutional claim under § 1983. 468 U.S. 992, 1008-09 (1984) (stating that
a statutory remedy precludes a constitutional claim under § 1983 if that claim is virtually
identical to the statutory claims and if Congress intends such a result); Mank, Using
§ 1983, supra note 11, at 335 & n.106 (citing Robinson; Zwibelman, supra note 129, at
1469-70).
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 334-35.
131.
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exceptional cases, § 1983 remains a generally and presumptively
available remedy for claimed violations of federal law .,,132
In analyzing whether a statute's remedial scheme is
incompatible with a separate § 1983 claim, the Supreme Court
has placed the burden on the defendant, who normally is a
recipient of federal aid, to show that .a statute's express remedies
conflict with those available under a § 1983 suit. 133
In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, [479 U.S. 418 (1987),] the Court stated that
§ 1983 normally established a remedial cause of action for
violation of federal statutory rights "unless the state actor
demonstrates by express provision or other specific
evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to
foreclose such private enforcement." In Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Ass'n, [496 U.S. 498 (1990),] the Court declared
that it would "recognize an exception to the general rule
that § 1983 provides a remedy for violation of federal
statutory rights only when Congress has affirmatively
withdrawn the remedy." Thus, the Supreme Court has
created a strong presumption in favor of [using] § 1983 ...
[to enforce] statutory [rights] unless the statute explicitly
forecloses § 1983 claims or contains a comprehensive
remedial scheme that is incompatible with separate
[remedies] under § 1983. 134

D. Section 1983 Allows Enforcement of Rights Even if There Is No
Private Right of Action
In 1990, the Supreme Court in its five-to-four Wilder
decision 135 concluded that § 1983 may be used to enforce federal
statutory rights-even if Congress did not create a remedy for
the statute and the plaintiff could not file an implied right of
136
action under the statute.
The Boren Amendment .to the
Medicaid statute137 requires each participating state to submit a
plan regarding how the state will determine reasonable and
adequate rates for payment of health care providers. 13B The
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) has authority to
132. 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 334.
133. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 335 & n.107 (citing Frye, supra note 129,
at 1187-88; Zwibelman, supra note 129, at 1475-76).
134. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 335-37 (footnotes omitted).
135. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
136. Id. at 508; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357.
137. Social Security Act, Medicaid, Grants to States for Medical Assistance, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000).
138. Id. § 1396a(a)(13)(A); Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502; Key, supra note 29, at 334.

HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1438 2002-2003

2003]

GONZAGA UNIVERSITY V. DOE

1439

withhold funding if a state fails to comply substantially with any
required provision of the statute, including the creation of a
reasonable reimbursement scheme. l39 The Secretary approved
Virginia's scheme for determining rates, but the plaintiff, a nonprofit organization representing both public and private hospitals
in Virginia, sued on the grounds that the reimbursement rates
l40
were not reasonable. The primary question was whether the
Boren Amendment merely established a limited procedural duty
that a state submit a plan to the federal government, or created a
substantive right enforceable under § 1983 on behalf of health
care providers that the State actually provide reasonable and
adequate reimbursement to them.l4l
In his majority OpInIOn, Justice Brennan explicitly
recognized that there is a "different inquiry" regarding whether a
suit may be filed under § 1983 than if the same underlying
statute allows a private cause of action. l42 Justice Brennan noted
that in implied right of action cases, courts use "the four-factor
Cort test to determine 'whether Congress intended to create the
private remedy asserted' for the violation of statutory rights."l43
Citing Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon v.
University of Chicago, Justice Brennan explained that "[t]he
[Cort] test reflects a concern, grounded in separation of powers,
that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of
remedies for violations of statutes."l44 By contrast, "[b]ecause
§ 1983 provides an 'alternative source of express congressional
authorization of private suits,"'l45 the Wilder Court concluded
"these separation-of-powers concerns are not present in a § 1983
case."l46 Accordingly, the Wilder Court determined that a
different standard applies for § 1983 actions than for implied
rights of action because separation-of-powers concerns are not
present in a § 1983 case. l47 Because § 1983 itself supplies' the
remedy, courts "recognize an exception to the general rule that
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; Key, supra note 29, at 334.
140.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 503-04.
141. ld. at 509-10; Key, supra note 29, at 334-38.
142.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9; Mank; Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357 & n.274.
143.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9 (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76
(1979)).
144. .ld. (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 742-49 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)).
145. ld. (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)).
146. ld.
147. ld.
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§ 1983 provides a remedy for violation of federal statutory rights
only when Congress has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy.,,148
The Wilder Court acknowledged that only federal rights are
149
enforceable under § 1983, and not just any federal law. In
determining whether the Boren Amendment to the federal
Medicaid statute gave ,health care providers a right to reasonable
reimbursement, the Wilder Court examined the three-part test
the Court had used in Golden State for whether a federal statute
creates an enforceable right under § 1983: first, is the plaintiff an
intended beneficiary of the statute; second, does the statute
establish a binding obligation rather than a mere "congressional
preference"; and third, is the statute not too ambiguous or vague
to be enforced by the judiciary.15o The Wilder Court "conclude[d]
that the Boren Amendment impose[d] a binding obligation on
States participating in the Medicaid program to adopt reasonable
and adequate rates and that this obligation is enforceable under
§ 1983 by health care providers."l5l The majority relied heavily on
the Boren Amendment's legislative history in determining that
the statute imposed a binding substantive duty on participating
152
states to develop reasonable and fair reimbursement rates.
Additionally, the majority determined that the requirement in
the statute that participating states provide postpayment state
administrative appeal remedies to health care providers to allow
them to challenge allegedly inadequate reimbursement rates was
not "sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional
intent to withdraw the private remedy of § 1983" because health
care providers had limited rights of appeal, and the Secretary
only had a limited role in reviewing rates. 153
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, argued that the standard for
implied rights of action was still relevant because Congress must
intend to establish a statutory right on behalf of the plaintiffs in
order for it to be enforceable under § 1983. 154 Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued,
while the Court's holding in Thiboutot rendered obsolete
some of the case law pertaining to implied rights of action,
148,
[d. (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v, City of L.A., 493 U.S, 103, 106-07
(1989); Wright v, Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U,S. 418, 423-24 (1987».
149.
[d. at 509 (citing Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106).
150.
[d.; Frye, supra note 129, at 1186 (summarizing the Wilder Court's examination
of the three-part test).
151.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512.
152.
See id. at 515 & n.13.
153. [d. at 522 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(37) (1982».
154.
[d. at 524-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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a significant area of overlap remained. For relief to be had
either under § 1983 or by implication under Cart v. Ash . ..
the language used by Congress must confer identifiable
enforceable rights. 155
He did acknowledge, however, that § 1983 suits could be used to
enforce identifiable statutory rights that lacked a statutory
remedy and could not be enforced as a private right of action. 156
In determining whether a statute conferred enforceable rights,
he contended that courts should follow "the traditional rule that
the first step in our exposition of a statute always is to look to the
statute's text and to stop there if the text fully reveals its
meaning."157 Focusing on the text of the Boren Amendment, he
argued that "the text does not clearly confer any substantive
rights on Medicaid services providers.,,158 Accordingly, he
contended that no right existed that could be enforced under
159 Chief Justice Rehnquist's textualist approach to
§ 1983.
determining statutory rights in his Wilder dissent foreshadowed
his methodology in the Gonzaga majority opinion.
Wilder established a broad standard for enforcing statutory
rights under § 1983. Because of § 1983's general presumption in
favor of enforcing mandatory and definite federal statutory rights
on behalf of their intended beneficiaries, a plaintiff is not
required to prove that Congress intended the statutory right be
enforceable under § 1983. 160 Thus, while plaintiffs in a private
right of action case have the burden of demonstrating that
Congress intended a private cause of action under the Supreme
Court's present reading of Cort's four-part test,161 there is a
presumption that a plaintiff may file a § 1983 suit if the plaintiff
can establish that it is the intended beneficiary of a definite
federal right. 162 To meet the three-part Blessing/Golden State

155. Id. at 526 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Key, supra note 29, at 335-36
(discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wilder).
156. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 525-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that § "1983
generally. .. supplies the remedy for the vindication of rights arising from federal
statutes"); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 359.
157.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 526 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Am. Tobacco Co. v.
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982)).
158. Id. at 527-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Key, supra note 29, at 336
(discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wilder).
159.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 527-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Key, supra note 29, at
336 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wilder).
160. Key, supra note 29, at 332-33; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357-59.
161. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11,
at 354-55 (summarizing Cort's four-part test).
162. Key, supra note 29, at 332-33; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357-59.
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163

standard for ascertaining whether a federal right is enforceable
under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the right is
sufficiently definite to be capable of judicial enforcement, and
that Congress intended to benefit a class that includes the
164
plaintiff. If a statute creates a federal right, there is a strong
presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983 unless the
statute explicitly forbids alternative remedies such as § 1983, or
a § 1983 suit would conflict with the remedial scheme in the
statute. 165 Accordingly, courts have recognized a § 1983 cause of
action even while refusing to infer a private right of action under
the same statutory provision. 166 Because Congress has explicitly
authorized § 1983 suits to enforce federal statutory rights, it is
appropriate to use § 1983 to enforce federal rights that may not
be enforced through a private right of action. 167
E. Suter v. Artist M: An Implicit Attack on the Presumptive
Enforcement of§ 1983?

By 1992, just two years after Wilder, Justices Brennan and
Marshall, who were in the majority in Wilder, had retired and
had been replaced by Justices Souter and Thomas. The change in
163. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 11, at 332. Refer to notes 121-26 supra and accompanying text.
164. Key, supra note 29, at 332-33; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357-59.
165. Key, supra note 29, at 332-33; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357-59.
Refer to notes 128-37 supra and accompanying text.
166. See Mallett v. Wis. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 1256-57 (7th Cir.
1997) (concluding that a plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim based on the Rehabilitation
Act because it created an enforceable right and did not preclude such relief, and also
concluding that there was no private right of action under the statute because its
language and legislative history suggested that the statute's administrative remedy was a
more appropriate enforcement mechanism); Chan v. City of N.Y., 1 F.3d 96, 102-04 (2d
Cir. 1993) (determining under the Cort test that § 5310 of the Housing and Community
Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5321, did not create an implied private right of
action, but concluding that the statute created substantive rights which could be enforced
through a § 1983 action under the Blessing/Wilder test); Fay v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch.
Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding no private right of action under FERPA, 20
U.S.C. § 1232g, but concluding that plaintiffs could sue under § 1983 to enforce FERPA
rights); Keaukaha-Panaewa Cmty. Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1467,
1470-71 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that plaintiffs could bring § 1983 action because the
relevant statute established a right for the benefit of Hawaiians such as plaintiffs and did
not preclude § 1983 remedy, but determining that no private right of action existed under
the statute); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357-59; Henry Paul Monaghan,
Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233, 24647 (1991). But see Mazzuchi, supra note 31, at 1064, 1093 (arguing that enforcement of
statutory rights by § 1983 should be restricted in future to cases in which rights could be
enforced through an implied or explicit private right of action, but conceding that many
cases have applied a more lenient standard in § 1983 suits).
167. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990) (observing that whether
a § 1983 suit is available presents a "different inquiry" than whether an implied right of
action exists); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357-59.

HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1442 2002-2003

2003]

GONZAGA UNIVERSITY V. DOE

1443

the Court's membership arguably was responsible for the
different result in its next major § 1983 decision. 16B Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Suter v. Artist M. /69
which held that § 671(a)(15) of the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980 (the "Adoption Act") "neither confers
an enforceable private right on its beneficiaries nor creates an
implied cause of action on their behalf.,,170 The Adoption Act
provided funds to states to offset expenses involved with
providing foster care and adoption services, but required
participating states to issue a plan insuring '''reasonable efforts
will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to
prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his
home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his
home.",171 The Secretary of HHS was required to approve the plan
and could terminate funding if the state failed to substantially
comply with the provisions of its approved plan. 172 The issue
before the Court was whether states had a duty to use reasonable
efforts to avoid removal of the child from the parent, or promote
reunification with the parents, that was enforceable by parents
through an action under § 1983.173
While not overruling Wilder and attempting to distinguish
that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Suter
took a far narrower approach in determining which types of
rights are enforceable under § 1983. 174 In determining whether
the Adoption Act established enforceable rights under § 1983,
Suter framed the issue this way: "Did Congress, in enacting the
Adoption Act, unambiguously confer upon the child beneficiaries
of the Act a right to enforce the requirement that the State make·
'reasonable efforts' to prevent a child from being removed from
his home, and once removed to reunify the child with his
family?,,175 The majority determined that the statutory term
"reasonable efforts" was relatively vague, and that the HHS
regulations did not sufficiently clarify the provision to make it

168.
169.
170.
171.

Key, supra note 29, at 338-39.
503 U.S. 347, 350 (1992).
[d. at 364; see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000).
Suter, 503 U.S. at 351 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988 & Supp.

1)).
172.

[d. at 360, 369 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 671(b)); see also Key, supra note 29, at 339
(summarizing § 671(a)-(b) as considered in Suter).
173.
Suter, 503 U.S. at 354, 357; Key, supra note 29, at 339 (summarizing the Suter
case).
174.
Key, supra note 29, at 339-40.
175.
Suter, 503 U.S. at 357; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 333
(analyzing the Suter case).
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enforceable on behalf of parents. 176 "To the extent [legislative]
history may be relevant," the Court decided it suggested
Congress wanted states to make "reasonable efforts," but also
"left a great deal of discretion" to states, which undermined the
respondents' argument that the reasonable efforts language
imposed definite rights. 177 Chief Ju,stice Rehnquist concluded that
the HHS "regulations are not specific and do not provide notice to
the States that failure to do anything other than submit a plan
with the requisite features, to be approved by the Secretary, is a
further condition on the receipt of funds from the Federal
Government.,,178 In other words, the HHS regulations simply
required that a state meet the procedural requirement of having
its plan approved by the Secretary to receive funding, but did not
give the states adequate notice that conditions set forth in the
plan, such as the "reasonable efforts" condition, would create
substantive duties enforceable by individuals. 179
The Court required the plaintiffs to show not just that the
"reasonable efforts" language itself is clear, but that Congress
intended that the language confer enforceable benefits on the
plaintiffs. 180 The Court stated:
Careful examination of the language relied upon by
respondents, in the context of the entire [Adoption] Act, leads
us to conclude that the "reasonable efforts" language does not
unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon the Act's
beneficiaries. The term "reasonable efforts" in this context is
at least as plausibly read to impose only a rather generalized
duty on the State, to be enforced not by private individuals,
but by the Secretary in the manner previously discussed. 18I
By requiring unambiguous evidence that Congress conferred a right
on the plaintiffs and not just a generalized duty on the state, Chief
Justice Rehnquist implicitly placed a burden of proof on the
plaintiffs that was similar to their burden of proof to show that
Congress intended to create an implied right of action. I82 In Suter,
Chief Justice Rehnquist blurred the line between § 1983 suits and
implied rights of action and laid the foundation for his later
Gonzaga opinion.
176.
Suter, 503 U.S. at 359-62.
177. Id. at 362 & n.15.
178. Id. at 362.
179. Id. at 362-63. But cf Key, supra note 29, at 340-45 (critiquing the Suter Court's
rationale).
180.
Suter, 503 U.S. at 363-64.
181. Suter, 503 U.S. at 363; see also Key, supra note 29, at 343-45 (examining the
Suter opinion).
182. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 363-64; Key, supra note 29, at 343-45.
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that the
"reasonable efforts" issue in Suter was "functionally identical" to
the question decided in Wilder. 183 He contended that the
majority's opinion was "plainly inconsistent" with Wilder.184
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for failing even to
mention the three-part [Golden State] test for determining
whether a federal statute creates an enforceable right
under § 1983 and for shifting the burden onto the plaintiffs
to prove that Congress had [intended to] confer[] on them
the right to enforce the statute under § 1983. 185
Before Gonzaga, some commentators argued that the Suter
decision was limited to its peculiar facts and did not
fundamentally narrow the liberal standard for enforcing § 1983
in Wright, Golden State, and Wilder.186 Initially, Suter had little
impact. The Supreme Court in Blessing endorsed and slightly
refined Golden State's three-part test rather than using Suter's
approach,187 and most lower courts continued to apply the threepart standard. 18B Mter Gonzaga, Suter's restrictive approach to
§ 1983 now appears to be the model rather than the liberal
standard presented in the Wright, Wilder; Blessing, and Golden
State line of cases.
IV. GONZAGA UNNERSITY V. DOE

A. Chief Justice Rehnquist Narrows § 1983 by Following Suter and
Pennhurst
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that the Court had granted certiorari in the case both
because of a split in the circuits regarding whether FERPA is
183. Suter, 503 U.S. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Key, supra note 29, at
339-40 (examining this statement from Justice Blackmun's dissent in Suter).
184. Suter, 503 U.S. at 365 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 333 & n.92 (citing Suter, 503 U.S. at 36477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Frye, supra note 129, at 1179-80, 1201-05 (arguing that
Suter confused lower courts as to whether the three-part test under § 1983 still applied)).
186. E.g., Albiston v. Me. Comm'r of Human Servs., 7 F.3d 258, 263 n.9 (1st Cir.
1993) (stating that Suter did not overrule Wilder or Wright); Joslin, supra note 109, at 222
& n.173; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 333-34; Pettys, supra note 55, at 69
n.112; Frye, supra note 129, at 1194-97.
187. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 339-40 (1997); Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 11, at 334.
188. E.g., Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1004 (11th Cir. 1997); Buckley v. City of
Redding, 66 F.3d 188, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1995); Wood v. Tompkins, 33 F.3d 600, 606 (6th
Cir. 1994); Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir. 1993); Joslin, supra note 109,
at 222 & n.173; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 334 n.94 (citing cases and Pettys,
supra note 55, at 69 n.112).
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enforceable under § 1983 and, more generally, because it
recognized that its decisions regarding when federal statutes are
enforceable under § 1983 are not "models of clarity.,,189 In
addressing the broader question of when federal statutes are
enforceable, Chief Justice Rehnquist not surprisingly emphasized
190
his restrictive analysis in Pennhurst and Suter. He observed
that in Pennhurst: "We made clear that unless Congress 'speak[s]
with a clear voice,' and manifests an 'unambiguous' intent to
confer individual rights, federal funding provisions provide no
basis for private enforcement by § 1983."191 Treating Pennhurst as
a defining case, he noted that Wright and Wilder were the only
two subsequent cases in which the Court had found that
spending legislation establishes rights enforceable through
§ 1983. 192 He interpreted Wright and Wilder as cases in which
Congress had clearly conferred specific monetary entitlements on
behalf of beneficiaries including the plaintiffs, suggesting that
these two cases were relatively easy cases for finding rights
enforceable through § 1983. 193 What he did not mention was that
both Wright and Wilder were five-to-four decisions in which he
had dissented. Justices O'Connor and Scalia also had dissented
in both cases;194 Justice Kennedy had dissented in Wilder, but
195
was not on the Court when Wright was decided. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Gonzaga opinion glossed over the difficulties the
Court had in deciding both Wright and Wilder when he tried to
show that the Court had always followed the "clear" and
"unambiguous" test regarding congressional intent used in
Pennhurst .196
Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that since
Wilder, the Court had "rejected attempts to infer enforceable
rights from Spending Clause statutes.,,197 He observed that his
majority opinion in Suter read the statute at issue "'in the light
shed by Pennhurst",198 and found that the statute did not confer
189.
122 S. Ct. 2268, 2272 (2002).
190.
Id. at 2273-74.
191.
Id. at 2273 (quoting and citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 17,28 & n.21 (1981)).
192.
Id. at 2273-74 (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990); Wright v.
Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987)).
193.
Id.
194.
See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 524 (indicating that Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented); Wright, 479 U.S. at 419 (indicating
that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Powell dissented).
195.
See Wright, 479 U.S. at 419.
196.
Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
197.
Id. at 2274.
198.
Id. (quoting Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358 (1992)).
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"specific, individually enforceable rights.,,199 Likewise, Chief
Justice Rehnquist observed that in Blessing u. Freestone 200 the
Court had found that the statute did not establish individual
rights, but merely required the federal agency to determine if a
state's child-welfare agencies met certain requirements in the
aggregate. 201
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed the respondent's
argument that the Court's § 1983 cases, especially Blessing and
Wright, "establish a relatively loose standard for finding rights
enforceable by § 1983" and that courts should find an enforceable
right "so long as Congress intended that the statute 'benefit'
putative plaintiffs.,,202 Furthermore, the respondent contended
that "a more 'rigorous' inquiry would conflate the standard for
inferring a private right of action under § 1983 with the standard
for inferring a private right of action directly from the statute
itself, which he admits would not exist under FERPA.,,203 The
respondent pointed to language in both Blessing and Wright that
an enforceable right exists under § 1983 when Congress intends
a statutory provision to "benefit" the plaintiff. 204
In response to the respondent's arguments, Chief Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged that "[s]ome language in our opinions
might be read to suggest that something less than an
unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983.,,205 For
example, despite Blessing's emphasis that only violations of
"rights, not laws,,,206 may establish a § 1983 action, he admitted
that some courts have interpreted Blessing's three-part test
as allowing plaintiffs to enforce a statute under § 1983 so
long as the plaintiff falls within the general zone of interest
that the statute is intended to protect; something less than
what is required for a statute to create rights enforceable
directly from the statute itself under an implied private
. ht 0f ac t·Ion. 207
rig
Furthermore, he conceded that Wilder supported the view of
some that "our implied private right of action cases have no
bearing on the standards for discerning whether a statute creates
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
496 U.S.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
520 u.s. 329 (1997).
Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2274 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343).
Id. (citing Brieffor Respondent at 40-46).
Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 41-43).
Id. at 2274-75 (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41; Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n,
498, 509 (1990)).
Id. at 2275.
Id. (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340).
Id.
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rights enforceable by § 1983," although he maintained that Suter
and Pennhurst suggested that this notion was wrong. 208
In Gonzaga, Chief Justice Rehnquist firmly endorsed the
restrictive approach to § 1983 rights in Suter and Pennhurst and
rejected any contrary views expressed in Wilder. 209 "We now
reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an
unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action
brought under § 1983."210 He emphasized that § 1983 may enforce
only statutory "rights, [and] not the broader or vaguer 'benefits'
or'interests."'211
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist significantly changed
the test for which rights are enforceable under § 1983 by
emphasizing that the same issue of congressional intent controls
as in implied right of action cases. "[W]e further reject the notion
that our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct
from our § 1983 cases. To the contrary, our implied right of action
cases should guide the determination of whether a statute
confers rights enforceable under § 1983."212 Chief Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged that Wilder had stated "whether a
statutory violation may be enforced through § 1983 'is a different
inquiry than that involved in determining whether a private
right of action can be implied from a particular statute.",213
However, he maintained that "the inquiries overlap in one
meaningful respect-in either case we must first determine
whether Congress intended to create a federal right.,,214
The difference between a private right of action and an
individual right enforceable through § 1983 is that the former
also requires "an intent 'to create not just a private right but also
a private remedy.",215 Accordingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted:
Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of
showing an intent to create a private remedy because
§ 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of
rights secured by federal statutes. Once a plaintiff

208.
[d. (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 & n.9, 509; Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,
363-64 (1992); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 & n.21
(1981).
209.
[d.
[d.
210.
211.
[d.
212.
[d.
213.
[d. (quoting Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9).
214.
[d.
215.
[d. at 2275-76 (alterations in original) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 286 (2001».
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demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the
216
right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that "the initial
inquiry-determining whether a statute confers any right at
all-is no different from the initial inquiry in an implied right of
action case, the express purpose of which is to determine whether
or not a statute 'confer[s] rights on a particular class of
persons.",217 Thus, he concluded:
A court's role in discerning whether personal rights exist in
the § 1983 context should therefore not differ from its role
in discerning whether personal rights exist in the implied
right of action context. Both inquiries simply require a
determination as to whether or not Congress intended to
218
confer individual rights upon a class ofbeneficiaries.
Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to Justice Stevens's
dissenting argument that a different standard should apply in
§ 1983 cases than in implied right of action cases because
separation-of-power concerns are greater in the latter context
219
than in the former:
[W]e fail to see how relations between the branches are
served by having courts apply a multi-factor balancing test
to pick and choose which federal requirements may be
enforced by § 1983 and which may not. Nor are separationof-powers concerns within the Federal Government the only
guideposts in this sort of analysis. 220
Instead, the Court cited Pennhurst and subsequent cases in
which it had declared that Congress must state its intention
clearly in the language of the statute if it wishes to alter the
balance of power between the states and the federal
221
government.
In a footnote, the Court observed that Justice
Stevens's assumption that Congress intended to provide millions
of students the right to sue despite the absence of any explicit

216.
[d. at 2276 (citation omitted).
217.
[d. (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)).
218.
[d. (citations omitted).
219.
[d. at 2277 (summarizing Justice Stevens's argument); see also id. at 2284
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
220.
[d.
[d. The Court quoted Will v. Michigan Department of State Police: "[I)f Congress
221.
intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute' (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v .. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); citing
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,99 (1984))." [d. (quoting Will v.
Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (alteration in original) (parallel
citations omitted)).
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evidence in the text was unconvincing because such a policy
would be contrary to "a tradition of deference to state and local
school officials.,,222 However, even if he is correct that Congress
did not intend to give millions of students the right to sue under
FE RPA, Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to respond to the
argument in Justice Stevens's dissent that this observation really
raised the issue of whether Congress intended to create a cause
of action under the statute, which is only supposed to be an issue
in implied action cases and not under § 1983. 223
Having adopted a restrictive test for whether federal
statutes are enforceable through § 1983, the Gonzaga Court
easily found that FERPA did not establish individual rights on
behalf of the plaintiffs, but that the statute only created
aggregate duties that educational institutions owed to the
Secretary of Education. 224 The majority concluded that FERPA's
nondisclosure provisions, which prohibit the Secretary of
Education from funding "'any educational agency or institution
which has a policy or practice of permitting the release of
education records,,,,225 address only "institutional policy and
practice, not individual instances of disclosure.,,226 Similar to its
analysis in Blessing, the Court concluded that the statute in
question did not establish individual rights, but only aggregate
ones, because recipient institutions are only required to be in
substantial compliance with federal regulations. 227 According to
the majority, any references in FERPA to individual consent
were "'policy or practice'" measures for determining aggregate
compliance by the institution and whether the federal
government should terminate funding, rather than evidence of
congressional intent to establish individual rights. 228
Furthermore, unlike Wright or Wilder, where one could not
file an individual written complaint for review, FERPA required
the Secretary of Education to establish a review board (the
Family Policy Compliance Office) to redress complaints, and the
222.
[d. at 2277 n.5.
223.
Refer to notes 282-90 infra and accompanying text (illustrating the distinction
between an implied right of action inquiry and the presumptive enforceability of
individual rights in § 1983 cases).
Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2277-78.
224.
225.
[d. at 2278 (alteration in original) (quoting FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1J-(2)).
[d.
226.
227.
[d. (citing FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1234c(a) (stating that educational institutions
can avoid termination of funding if they "'comply substantially' with [FERPA's)
requirements"), and Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 335, 343 (1997) (concluding that
Title IV-D did not establish individual rights because recipients need only achieve
"'substantial compliance' with federal regulations")).
228. [d.
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Court interpreted the statute's creation of this review board as
evidence that Congress did not intend to establish individually
enforceable rights. 229 Additionally, the Court concluded that
Congress's prohibition against regional offices' review of
complaints was significant in showing that there was no
230
congressional intent to allow individual suits. While the Court's
opinion generally addressed only the text of FERPA, Chief
Justice Rehnquist quoted a joint statement in the congressional
record that explained that Congress had centralized review in
the Secretary to avoid "multiple interpretations" of FERPA. 231
The Court concluded that it was "implausible to presume that the
same Congress nonetheless intended private suits to be brought
before thousands of federal- and state-court judges, which could
only result in the sort of 'multiple interpretations' the Act
explicitly sought to avoid.,,232
The majority concluded that rights are enforceable through
§ 1983 only if there is "clear" and "unambiguous" evidence that
Congress intended to establish an individual right. 233 The
standard for enforcing rights under § 1983 was "no less and no
more than what is required for Congress to create new rights
enforceable under an implied private right of action.,,234 Because
FERPA's nondisclosure provisions had an aggregate focus on the
behavior of educational institutions and the Secretary of
Education, the Court held that the statute did not create rights
enforceable through § 1983. 235 Accordingly, it reversed the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, which had
erroneously found that the statute created rights enforceable by
236
§ 1983.

229.
[d. at 2278-79. Because it concluded that FERPA did not establish enforceable
rights, the Court did not address "whether FERPA's [review] procedures are 'sufficiently
comprehensive' to offer an independent basis for precluding private enforcement." [d. at
2279 n.8 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. 1, 20 (1981)).
230.
[d. at 2279 (citing FERPA, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(g)).
231.
[d. (quoting 120 CONGo REC. 39,863 (1974) (joint statement) (expressing
"'concern that regionalizing the enforcement of [FERPA] may lead to multiple
interpretations of it, and possibly work a hardship on parents, students, and
institutions'").
232.
[d.
233.
[d.
234.
[d.
235.
[d.
236.
[d.
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B. Justice Breyer's Concurrence in the Judgment Questions the
Majority's Textualism
Concurring in the judgment of the Court, Justice Breyer,
with whom Justice Souter joined, agreed with the majofity that
the "ultimate question" regarding whether private individuals
may enforce a federal statute through § 1983 is "a question of
congressional intent.,,237 Citing Blessing, Suter, Wilder, and
Wright, Justice Breyer offered his opinion that "the factors set
forth in this Court's § 1983 cases are helpful indications of that
intent."238 He argued, however, that "the statute books are too
many, the laws too diverse, and their purposes too complex, for
any single legal formula to offer more than general guidance.,,239
He disagreed with the Court's attempt to "pre-determine" the
evaluation of congressional intent regarding a specific statute
through "the majority's presumption that a right is conferred
only if set forth 'unambiguously' in the statute's 'text and
structure. ",240
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that Congress did
not intend private judicial enforcement of FERPA's nondisclosure
241
procedures. He concurred with the Court's analysis that the
statute has an institutional focus, and that the relevant statutory
provision does not refer to individual rights. 242 He was likewise in
accord with the Court's determination that the statute's
centralized administrative enforcement procedures suggest that
Congress did not intend to allow private federal suits. 243
Additionally, he argued that the statute's "broad and
244
nonspecific" language left schools uncertain about their duties.
He thought it unlikely that Congress intended to subject schools
to suits over the statute's broad and uncertain terms. 245 In light of
FERPA's open-ended language, he thought it likely that
Congress intended to give the Department of Education exclusive
jurisdiction to interpret the statute's terms in order to provide
consistent guidance and to avoid inconsistent interpretations
246
that might arise in private suits for damages.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 2279 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting id. at 2273, 2278).
at 2279-80 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 2280 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 2279-80 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
at 2280 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Stevens's Dissent Defends the Presumption that Federal
Rights Are Enforceable Through § 1983

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, attacked both the majority's conclusion that FERPA
did not establish individual rights and its broader methodology
for determining whether Congress intended to establish
individual rights enforceable under § 1983. 247 In Part I of his
dissent, Justice Stevens contended that the majority should have
considered the context of the entire FERPA statute, which
includes ten subsections, rather than just a single provision, in
determining whether its purpose was to establish an individual
right. 24s He argued that FERPA's provisions for both parental
rights of access to student records and student rights of privacy
in such records did establish individual rights for both students
and parents enforceable through § 1983. 249 While conceding that
the specific statutory provision at issue in the case, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b), was "not as explicit" as other parts of the statute, he
argued that "it is clear that, in substance, § 1232g(b) formulates
an individual right: in respondent's words, the 'right of parents to
withhold consent and prevent the unauthorized release of
education record information by an educational institution ...
that has a policy or practice of releasing such information.",25o He
contended that the provision met Blessing's three-factor test
because "[i]t is directed to the benefit of individual students and
parents; the provision is binding on States, as it is 'couched in
mandatory, rather than precatory, terms'; and the right is far
from 'vague and amorphous.",251 Additionally, he maintained that
"the right at issue is more specific and clear" than rights
previously determined to be enforceable by § 1983 in Wright or
Wilder. 252
He disagreed with the majority's conclusion that § 1232g(b)
has an aggregate focus. He pointed out that the provision allows

247.
See id. at 2280-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's ratio
decidendi as seeming to find both that FERPA does not create federal rights and, in the
alternative, that the rights created by FERPA "are of a lesser value because Congress did
not intend them to be enforceable by their owners").
248.
See id. at 2281-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Although § 1232g(b) alone provides
strong evidence that an individual federal right has been created, this conclusion is
bolstered by viewing the provision in the overall context ofFERPA.").
249.
[d. at 2280-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250.
[d. at 2281 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for
Respondent at 11).
251.
[d. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41
(1997)).
252.
[d. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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institutions to release information "so long as 'there is written
consent'" from the individual student or a parent, if the student
is a minor child. 253 Furthermore, even if a pattern or practice of
inappropriate treatment is necessary to assert an individual
right, he argued that the right is still individually enforceable. 254
Additionally, he maintained that other provisions of FERPA
support the view that the statute establishes individual rights. 255
In Part II, Justice Stevens attacked "the Court's novel use of
our implied right of action cases in determining whether a
federal right exists for § 1983 purposes.,,256 He argued that the
majority's requirement of clear textual evidence that Congress
intended to establish an individual right inappropriately adopted
the test used in implied right of action cases; whether Congress
intended to establish a private remedy is an unnecessary inquiry
in § 1983 cases, which the majority acknowledged because § 1983
allows private enforcement of any statute creating a distinct
federal right, even if there is no private right of action under the
substantive statute. 257 Under the separation-of-powers principle
that the legislature alone has the authority to establish remedies
for violations of statutory conditions, it is necessary to
demonstrate that Congress intended to create an implied right of
action. 258 By contrast, the same separation-of-powers issues do
not apply under § 1983 "because Congress expressly authorized
private suits in § 1983 itself.,,259 Justice Stevens charged that the
Court's use of the implied right of action framework in § 1983
cases was inconsistent with precedent and that the majority's
clear and unambiguous test had sub silentio overruled the Wilder
and Wright decisions. 26o
Justice Stevens further argued that the majority had gone
beyond Pennhurst, Blessing, and Suter's requirement that § 1983
may only enforce individual rights binding on states-rather
than mere precatory hopes found in a statute-and imposed a
new requirement that there be clear and unambiguous evidence
that Congress intended to make a right enforceable through

253.
[d. at 2282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. [d. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255. [d. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. [d. at 2284 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. [d. at 2284-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2284 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Olur implied right of action cases
258.
'reflec[tl a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the
courts controls the availability of remedies for violations of statutes."') (second alteration
in original) (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990».
[d. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9 (1990».
259.
260. [d. at 2284 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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261 While the Court stated that it was not adopting the
remedies portion of the test for implying a private right of action
into the § 1983 context, Justice Stevens argued that the
majority's approach essentially did so and, thus, defeated the
"presumptive enforceability of rights under § 1983."262 He argued
that the Court's "implied right of action cases do not necessarily
cleanly separate out the 'right' question from the 'cause of action'
question.,,263 The majority claimed that it was not requiring proof
that Congress intended to allow a remedy under § 1983, but only
that the statute at issue creates an individually enforceable
right. 264 If the majority was being truthful, Justice Stevens
argued, its "new" approach was no different from Blessing's
three-factor test, and "[i]ndeed, the Court's analysis, in part,
closely tracks Blessing's factors, as it examines the statute's
language, and the asserted right's individual versus systematic
thrust.,,265 However, Justice Stevens contended that the majority
had in fact placed the burden on the plaintiffs to show that
Congress intended to establish a private remedy enforceable
through § 1983 by addressing whether it was likely that
"Congress nonetheless intended private suits to be brought
before thousands of federal- and state-court judges.,,266 Thus, he
argued that the majority had "eroded-if not eviscerated-the
long-established principle of presumptive enforceability of rights
under § 1983" and that, under the majority's approach, "a right
under Blessing is second class compared to a right whose
enforcement Congress has clearly intended."267 He concluded by
criticizing the majority for "blur [ring] the long-recognized
distinction between rights and remedies" and for failing to clarify
the Court's § 1983 jurisprudence. 268
§ 1983.

D. Analysis
Chief Justice Rehnquist correctly observed that the Court's
§ 1983 cases had failed to provide a consistent standard for when
federal statutes are enforceable under § 1983. 269 However,
261.
[d. at 2284-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[d. at 2285 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262.
[d. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263.
[d. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2276).
264.
[d. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2277).
265.
[d. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2279).
266.
[d. at 2285-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267.
268.
[d. at 2286 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269.
See id. at 2274-75 (noting the inconsistency in some of the Court's § 1983
opinions, and further claiming that "[f]ueling this uncertainty is the notion that our
implied right of action cases have no bearing on the standards for discerning whether a
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Gonzaga's requirement of "clear" and "unambiguous" evidence
that Congress intended to establish an individual right does not
provide a better test because the Court does not define these
terms, other than to suggest that they are more stringent than
the Court's approach in Wilder. 270 The Court does not explain
what types of evidence should matter in making the
determination of whether there is "clear" and "unambiguous"
evidence of intent. 271 A similar problem arises when the Court
wrestles with whether to infer an implied right of action. Justice
Kennedy has conceded that "[t]he Court has encountered great
difficulty in establishing standards for deciding when to imply a
private cause of action under a federal statute which is silent on
the subject."272 Some portions of the Gonzaga opinion suggest a
preference for textual evidence of intent, but as Part VI of this
Article will show, courts may still consider legislative history
. .m t ent .273
wh en assessmg
Justice Breyer suggested that he preferred a case-by-case
analysis of whether Congress intended to provide individual
rights rather than the majority's restrictive focus on whether
congressional intent to confer an individual right was
"unambiguously" included in a statute's "text and structure."274
He thus implied that he disagreed with an exclusively textual
approach to ascertaining congressional intent,275 although Part VI
of this Article will show that whether the majority's opinion
actually was textualist in nature is open to debate. 276 Justice
Breyer struck a middle-of-the-road position by citing a range of
Court opinions-Blessing, Suter, Wilder, and Wright-some of
statute creates rights enforceable by § 1983").
Refer to notes 229-32 supra and accompanying text (inferring that the Court
270.
found evidence of congressional intent to establish individual enforcement less "clear" in
cases such as Wilder, in which the statute did not allow for a review board such as that
created under FERPA).
271.
See Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2279 (declaring that "if Congress wishes to create
new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms,"
finding no new enforceable rights, and mereiy explaining that "FERPA's nondisclosure
provisions contain no rights-creating language, they have an aggregate, not individual,
focus, and they serve primarily to direct the Secretary of Education's distribution of public
funds to educational institutions").
272.
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 656 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also Zeigler, supra note 48, at 91.
Refer to notes 356-72 infra and accompanying text (acknowledging Gonzaga's
273.
textualist emphasis while also arguing that the decision, along with the Court's
precedent, reveals an acceptance of using both the statute's text and its legislative history
when determining intent).
274.
Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2279 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting id.
at 2273, 2278).
275. [d. at 2279 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
276.
Refer to notes 356-72 infra and accompanying text.
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which took broader or narrower approaches to the question of
enforcing federal statutes through § 1983. 27.7 Unlike Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Breyer appeared to prefer the Court's hitherto
ambiguous § 1983 jurisprudence to a clear approach that might
prevent the enforcement of some statutory rights that did not fit
the precise mold of the majority's clear and unambiguous test for
.
congressional intent.
In Part II of his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the
Court was adopting an unnecessarily stringent standard -in
§ 1983 cases that inappropriately adopted the framework used in
implied right of action cases, even though the same separation of
powers concerns did not apply. 278 Justice Stevens vigorously
defended the broad approach to enforcement of § 1983 implicit in
Blessing's three-factor test, as well as in Wilder, under which
there is a strong presumption that definite and mandatory
federal rights may be enforced by their intended beneficiaries. 279
Additionally, Justice Stevens contended that the majority's
approach in fact placed a burden on plaintiffs to show Congress
intended to make a right "enforceable" through § 1983, and not
just that Congress intended to establish an individual right on
behalf of a class including the plaintiff. 280 The argument,
advanced by both the majority opinion and Justice Breyer, that it
was unlikely Congress wanted thousands of potentially
conflicting federal lawsuits after it had centralized
administrative enforcement, supports Justice Stevens's charge
that the Court was blurring the line between rights and
· 281
reme dles.
As Justice Stevens correctly observed, the Court's use of the
implied right of action framework in § 1983 cases was
inconsistent with precedent because the majority asked not just
whether Congress intended to create a right, but also whether
Congress intended to allow a remedy under § 1983. 282 By asking
whether Congress intended to allow a remedy under § 1983 for
FERPA violations, the majority effectively overruled the
presumption that all individual rights derived from federal
statutes are enforceable, which is the rule the Court followed in
the Wilder and Wright decisions. 283 The Court has acknowledged
277.
Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2279 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
278.
Id. at 2284 & n.8, 2285-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
280.
Id. at 2284-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. Id. at 2279; id. at 2280 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2285-86
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
282.
Id. at 2284 & n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283.
Id. at 2284 & n.8, 2285-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that it is more difficult to prove Congress intended to create an
implied cause of action than an implied substantive right because
a statute's legislative history is less likely to address an implicit
right to sue. 284 Thus, the Court should not have considered
whether it was likely that Congress would have wanted
thousands of private FERPA suits under § 1983. 285 That is the
right question regarding whether Congress intended to create a
cause of action, but is not relevant regarding whether a statute
has created an individual right that is in turn presumptively
enforceable by § 1983. 286 If in fact the majority meant to overrule
the presumption that individual federal statutory rights are
presumptively enforceable, the Court should have said so
directly.
The Court should have placed the burden on the defendant
to prove that Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 remedies. In
Gonzaga, the Court should have found an individual right under
FERPA and then determined whether Congress intended to
make the centralized administrative review process the exclusive
remedy for any violations, thereby precluding suits under
287
§ 1983. The burden of proof should have been on the defendant
to show that Congress intended to preclude § 1983 suits in light
of the statute's administrative review process. Justice Stevens
made a fairly strong case that § 1232g(b), in light of the entire
284.
See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
25 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
legislative history is unlikely to supply affirmative evidence of congressional intent to
establish private remedies that the statute fails to mention); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979) (observing that legislative history is usually
silent regarding congressional intent to create a private right of action if the statute does
not explicitly provide a private remedy); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979)
("We must recognize, however, that the legislative history of a statute that does not
expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on
the question."); Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 31-32 (observing that
following Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon, the Court has placed a greater emphasis on
legislative intent, but "has been less willing to rely on legislative history for evidence of
[such] intent" when inferring a private right of action); Zeigler, supra note 48, at 111 &
n.237 (analyzing the distinction between the determination of an implied right and the
determination of an implied cause of action).
285.
Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2279; id. at 2280 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 2285 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
286.
See id. at 2284-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287. Because it concluded that FERPA did not establish individually enforceable
rights, the Court did not address whether FERPA's review procedures are '''sufficiently
comprehensive'" to preclude private enforcement. [d. at 2279 n.8 (quoting Sea Clammers,
453 U.S. at 20). Refer to note 232 supra and accompanying text (discussing how the Court
did not reach the issue of whether the review procedures were "sufficiently
comprehensive"). In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that FERPA's review procedures
were not sufficiently comprehensive to preclude private enforcement. Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct.
at 2283 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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FERPA statute, suggests Congress intended to give individual
rights to students and their teachers, although some provisions
do suggest a more aggregate focus, as the majority and Justice
Breyer conclude'd. 288 Mter finding that an individual right
existed, the Court should have determined if the centralized
administrative
review
procedures
were
sufficiently
comprehensive to overcome the strong presumption in favor of
enforcing federal rights through § 1983. Most likely the review
procedures are not enough to meet the Sea Clammers exclusion
test because they do not provide individual remedies. 289 By
blurring the right versus remedy distinction, Chief Justice
Rehnquist i~appropriately used evidence about whether the
statute's remedies should preclude the enforcement of rights
under § 1983 to address the separate issue of whether Congress
intended to create an individual remedy under FERPA. 290 In
effect the Court inappropriately placed the burden of proof on the
plaintiff. Instead, the Court should have presumed that the
FERPA rights are enforceable and then given the defendant the
opportunity to prove that the narrow Sea Clammers' preclusion
test applies.

v.

ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATIONS THROUGH §

1983

Since the 1930s, it has been common for Congress to write
statutes that address broad giJals and then delegate the
remaining details to executive agencies. 291 Courts have generally
288, Refer to notes 248-51 supra and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Stevens's contention that the majority should have considered the statute as a whole
rather than evaluating a single provision),
289. See Gonzaga, 122 S, Ct, at 2283 (Stevens, J" dissenting) (contending that the
FERPA review procedures are distinguishable from those in Sea Clammers because
"FERPA provides no guaranteed access to a formal administrative proceeding or to
federal judicial review; rather, it leaves to administrative discretion the decision whether
to follow up on individual complaints"),
290. Some commentators have argued that rights and remedies should be examined
in an integrated fashion, but that clearly is not the current law, as they recognize. See,
e.g" Zeigler, supra note 48, at 123-47 (proposing integrated analysis for determining
whether a statutory provision should be judicially enforceable, but recognizing that courts
currently treat rights and remedies as separate issues in many cases); Mazzuchi, supra
note 31, at 1064, 1093-96, 1117-18 (arguing that courts should apply the same test for
enforcement of statutory rights by § 1983 as implied or explicit private rights of action,
but acknowledging that current law applies a more lenient standard in § 1983 suits).
291. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. 1. REV. 323, 326
n.20 (1987) ("The year 1937 signalled [sicl the end of the brief Schechter era during which
the Court invoked the delegation doctrine to invalidate broad delegations of power."). See
generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response
to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391 (1987) (discussing the appropriateness of
congressional delegation of authority to agencies and that reporting courts have almost
always approved such delegations); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and
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allowed such delegation of authority as long as Congress provides
some guidelines for how the agency should promulgate any
necessary regulations. 292 It is also common for agencies to
interpret the statutes that govern them. Because agencies
usually have more expertise with implementing statutes than
federal judges, the Supreme Court in its 1984 decision Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 293
established the rule that courts should defer to an agency's
reasonable interpretation of a statute if the statute is silent or
ambiguous about the particular issue in question. 294
If a regulation goes beyond the explicit language of a statute
to clarify or establish a right that is generally compatible with
the statute's goals, should courts treat that right as enforceable
under § 1983?295 Courts have divided about whether regulations
alone may create rights enforceable through § 1983, or whether a
regulation may merely clarify a right explicitly established in a
statute. 296 "The Sixth Circuit has indicated most clearly that
federal regulations may create rights that are enforceable under
§ 1983."297 "Additionally, some federal courts have suggested that
Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419 (1987) (same).
Opponents of delegation often argue that vague delegations delegitimize representative
governance or suggest that statutory vagueness leads to an overall reduction in public
welfare. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
131-34 (1980); DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 3-21 (1993); Peter H. Aranson et aI., A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); Theodore J. Lowi, Two
Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
295,296-312,314-18,321-22 (1987).
292.
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475-76 (2001) (holding
the Clean Air Act's delegation of determination of air quality standards to EPA is
constitutional); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) ("The
rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration
of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is the power to adopt
regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute."
(quotation marks omitted)); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 339-40; Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 1-2,8,20-21 (1996) [hereinafter Pierce, Agency Authority]'
293.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
294. See id. at 842-43; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 340; Pettys, supra note
55, at 81-82.
295. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 339-40; see also Pierce, Agency Authority,
supra note 292, at 1-2 & passim (discussing whether agency regulations may be enforced
as implied rights of action).
296.
See Hill v. S.F. Hous. Auth., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025-26 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(discussing the split in the circuit courts over whether administrative regulations may
establish enforceable rights under § 1983); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 340,
346-53 (providing a detailed discussion of the split in the circuit courts over whether
administrative regulations may establish enforceable rights under § 1983).
297. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 347 (citing and discussing Loschiavo v.
City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1994».
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federal regulations may create a right enforceable under § 1983 if
the regulation" was issued by the agency pursuant to an explicit
. congressional requirement and thus "has the 'force and effect of
law.",298 The Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits' decisions have
adopted the narrow approach that regulations may create
enforceable rights only if they clearly reflect rights already
inherent in the statute itself.299 For example, the Eleventh and
Fourth Circuits have stated that regulations may not
independently establish rights under § 1983, but may only
"further define" or "flesh out" rights already implicit in the
underlying statute. 300 In some decisions, it is not clear whether a
court relied on a regulation alone or on both the regulation and
the statute to establish a right enforceable under § 1983. 301
Mter Gonzaga, it is likely that the Supreme Court would
hold that a regulation by itself may not establish a right
enforceable through § 1983 because of that decision's emphasis
on proof that Congress intended to establish an individual
right. 302 Yet even under Gonzaga's restrictive requirement of
"clear" and "unambiguous" evidence of congressional intent,303
there is still a role for regulations to clarify, "further define," or
"flesh out" statutory rights. Because agencies are usually
298.
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 347 & n.196 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 (1979)); id. at 347 & n.197, 348 & nn.198-99 (citing Samuels
v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("At least where Congress
directs regulatory action, we believe that the substantive federal regulations issued under
Congress' mandate constitute 'laws' within the meaning of [§J 1983."); see also DeVargas
v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 724 n.19 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing
Samuels, the Tenth Circuit stated in dicta that "[iJn at least some instances, violations of
rights provided under federal regulations provide a basis for § 1983 suits")). But see S.
Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 783-85 (3d Cir.
2001) (arguing that prior cases including Samuels did not hold that regulations alone may
create rights enforceable through § 1983), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002). The
Supreme Court first used the "force and effect of law" test in Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at
301-03, to give greater deference to agency regulations that are issued pursuant to an
explicit congressional mandate.
'
299. South Camden, 274 F.3d at 781-90; Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1007-08
(11th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 982, 984 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 348-53 (discussing in detail whether regulations may help
define statutory rights under § 1983).
300. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11th Cir. 1998); Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09;
Kirk, 821 F.2d at 984; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 348-53 (discussing the cited
Fourth and Eleventh Circuit cases).
301. See, e.g., Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(analyzing both the statute and its accompanying regulations in determining whether an
enforceable § 1983 right existed); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 343-44
(discussing the ambiguity in Wright as to whether statute or regulation created the right
at issue).
302. Refer to text accompanying notes 190-95 supra (describing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's "restrictive analysis").
303. [d.
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involved III Congress's drafting of any statute within their
jurisdiction, agency regulations often provide insight into
congressional intent and, therefore, courts should consider them
in determining Congress's likely intent. 304 Gonzaga did not
overrule Wright, which clearly relied on agency regulations to
define the scope of a statutory right. 305
A. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing

Authority
In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing
Authority,306 the Supreme Court held that particular Department
of Housing and Urban Redevelopment (HUD) regulations
established enforceable rights under § 1983. 307 In Wright, the
plaintiffs, who were tenants in a municipal low-income housing
project, argued that the public housing authority violated their
rights by not including their utility costs as part of the maximum
rent allowed under the statute, despite HUD regulations that
defined the statutory term "rent" to include payments for
reasonable utility costS. 308 Justice White interpreted the scope of
the statute's limit on rent in light of the HUD's regulations. 309
The Court stated:
The regulations ... defining the statutory concept of "rent"
as including utilities, have the force oflaw .... In our view,
the benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are
sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable
rights under Pennhurst and § 1983, rights that are not, as
respondent suggests, beyond the competence of the
judiciary to enforce. 3lo
Unfortunately, as Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion
correctly pointed out, the Court's opinion did not clearly explain
whether the HUD regulations simply defined a right already
implicit in the statute's definition of "rent," or whether the
304.
See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial
Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1283-84 (1996) [hereinafter Mank, Textualistl
(explaining the close ties between federal agencies and the legislative process).
305.
Refer to text accompanying notes 191-92 supra (explaining how Chief Justice
Rehnquist interpreted Wright and Wilder in accordance with Pennhurst and Gonzaga).
306.
479 U.S. 418 (1987).
307. Id. at 431-32; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 342.
308. Wright, 479 U.S. at 419, 420 & n.3, 421 & n.4, 422 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 860.403
(1982), and citing 24 C.F.R. § 865.470 (1983»; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 34243.
309.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 430; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 343.
310.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32 (citation omitted); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note
11, at 343 & n.164.
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regulations alone created rights enforceable though § 1983. 311 In a
footnote, the majority suggested that regulations may establish
rights as long as the statute delegates the authority to create
such rights to the agency in charge of implementing the statute:
"The dissent may have a different view, but to us it is clear that
the regulations gave low-income tenants an enforceable right to a
reasonable utility allowance and that the regulations were fully
authorized by the statute."312 However, even that observation by
Justice White was somewhat ambiguous as to whether the right
in question arose from the statute or the regulation. 313
In her dissenting opinion in Wright, Justice O'Connor, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia,
argued that the test for whether an enforceable right exists
under § 1983 should be whether Congress intended to create a
specific statutory right for the benefit of a class including the
plaintiff. 314 Her argument foreshadows the majority opinion in
Gonzaga. She maintained that the Court should examine implied
right of action cases in determining whether a statute creates a
federal right in favor ofthe plaintiff, because "[w]hether a federal
statute confers substantive rights is not an issue unique to
§ 1983 actions. In implied right of action cases, the Court has
also asked ... whether 'the statute create[s] a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff."'315 She contended that implied right of
action cases focus on congressional intent in determining
whether a federal right exists in favor of the plaintiff and that
congressional intent was also the "'key to the inquiry'" in
determining whether a broad statutory remedy precluded a suit
under § 1983. 316 Even assuming that the regulations at issue
created clear rights on behalf of the plaintiffs,317 those rights
should not be enforceable through § 1983 because there was no
311.
See Wright, 479 U.S. at 437-38 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 11, at 343-44; Pettys, supra note 55, at 74-75.
312.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 420 n.3; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 343 & n.165.
313.
See Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 343-44.
314.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 433 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 11, at 344 & n.169.
315.
See Wright, 470 U.S. at 432-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975»; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 344 & n.170. But cf Key,
supra note 29, at 332-33 (arguing that Justice O'Connor incorrectly relied on implied
right of action cases because "§ 1983 itself explicitly authorizes private causes of action").
316.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'! Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981)); Mank, Using
§ 1983, supra note 11, at 344 & n.171.
317. Justice O'Connor also argued, however, that the temporary HUD regulations
were too vague in defining the term "reasonable" to create valid rights capable of judicial
enforcement. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 438-40 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, Using
§ 1983, supra note 11, at 345 & n.178 (citing Wright; Pettys, supra note 55, at 75).
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evidence that "Congress intended to create a statutory
entitlement to reasonable utilities.,,318 She argued that it was
inappropriate to enforce regulations through § 1983 unless there
was evidence in the statute itself that Congress intended to
create an enforceable right. 319 Justice O'Connor stated:
I am concerned, however, that lurking behind the Court's
analysis may be the view that, once it has been found that a
statute creates some enforceable right, any regulation
adopted within the purview of the statute creates rights
enforceable in federal courts, regardless of whether
Congress or the promulgating agency ever contemplated
the result .... Such a result, where determination of § 1983
"rights" has been unleashed from any connection to
congressional intent, is troubling indeed. 320
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not clarified
Wright. In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n,321 the Supreme
Court relied in part on implementing regulations in rejecting the
defendant's contention that a statutory obligation requiring
states to adopt. "reasonable and adequate" reimbursement
procedures for medicaid costs was "too vague and amorphous.,,322
The Court stated: "As in Wright, the statute and regulation set
out factors which a State must consider in adopting its rates.,,323
Like Wright, the Wilder decision failed to specify to what extent
the right was based on the statute or the regulations, but the
Wilder Court apparently relied more on the statute and less on
the regulations than the Wright decision. 324 In Suter v. Artist
M.,325 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the HHS
regulations were not specific and did not provide states with

318.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 434-37 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 11, at 344 & n.172.
319.
Wright, 479 U.S. at 433,437-38,441 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Key, supra note
29, at 331; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 344-45.
320.
See Wright, 479 U.S. at 438 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
321. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
322. Id. at 519.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 519-21 (noting that the statute at issue "provides, if anything, more
guidance than the provision at issue in Wright"); Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283
F.3d 531, 536-37 (3d Cir. 2002) (en bane) (emphasizing the Wilder Court's attention to the
statute as opposed to the regulations at issue), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 100 (2002); Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 346 & n.187 (opining that because the Wilder Court relied
so heavily on the statute, "Wright remains the Supreme Court's most direct and
important use of regulations to create enforceable rights under § 1983"). But cf Suter v.
Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) ("The opinions in both Wright and Wilder took pains to
analyze the statutory provisions in detail, in light of the entire legislative
enactment .... ").
325. 503 U.S. at 347.
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notice that parents could sue if a state failed to comply with the
conditions in its plan. 326 It is noteworthy that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Suter opinion examined the relevant regulations in
deciding whether the state had notice that its plan created
enforceable rights. 327
.
.
B. The Split in the Circuits Since Wright

There has been controversy over the meaning of Wright and
especially over whether the Supreme Court indicated that a
regulation alone could be enforceable through § 1983. 328 Citing
Wright, the Sixth Circuit in Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn
declared: "As federal regulations have the force of law, they
likewise may create enforceable rights.,,329 On the other hand, in
Harris v. James,330 the Eleventh Circuit "conclude[d] that the
Wright majority did not hold that federal rights are created
either by regulations 'alone' or by any valid administrative
interpretation of a statute creating some enforceable right."331 In
2001, the Third Circuit in South Camden Citizens in Action v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 332 agreed
with Harris and interpreted Wright as having decided that the
regulation "merely defined the specific right that Congress had
already conferred through the statute."333 Furthermore, the Third
Circuit in South Camden concluded that § 1983 may enforce only
those rights that Congress has explicitly included in a statute
326. See id. at 362-63.
327. Refer to notes 174-85 supra and accompanying text (describing the Court's
rationale in Suter).
328. See Ceaser v. Pataki, No. 98 CIV.8532 (LMM), 2002 WL 472271, at *2-*3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (discussing disagreement by courts over whether Wright allows
§ 1983 suits based on regulations alone or only where the "regulation is linked to federal
statues [sic) authorizing it"); Bradford C. Mank, South Camden Citizens in Action v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: Will Section 1983 Save Title VI Disparate
Impact Suits?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10454, 10475-76 (2002) [hereinafter Mank, South
Camden) (discussing conflicting interpretations of whether Wright allows regulation alone
to establish a right enforceable through § 1983); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at
342-46 (same).
329. 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994). For a similar approach by the Ninth Circuit,
see Buckley v. City of Redding, in which the court suggested agency regulations created
an enforceable binding obligation on a municipality receiving federal funds for
recreational boating facilities to allow access to a river for the benefit of recreational
boaters. 66 F.3d 188, 189 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 777-777k and 50 C.F.R.
§ 80.24); see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 347-48 (discussing these and
other similar cases).
330.
127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997).
331. Id. at 1008; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 348-49 (discussing Harris).
332.
274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2621 (2002).
333. Id. at 783 (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 430
n.11 & 431 (1987)); Mank, South Camden, supra note 328, at 10475-76.

HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 1465 2002-2003

1466

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[39:5

and may not be used to enforce otherwise valid regulations that
go beyond the rights set forth in a statute. 334 Both Harris and
South Camden explicitly rejected the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Loschiavo that regulations alone may establish rights
enforceable under § 1983. 335
Both Harris 336 and South Camden 337 applied essentially the
same "unambiguous" evidence of congressional intent test that
the Supreme Court later endorsed in Gonzaga. 33S Citing Supreme
Court decisions requiring congressional intent to create an
implied right of action, the Eleventh Circuit in Harris
determined that congressional intent was also crucial in
determining whether a right was enforceable under § 1983:
In our view, the driving force behind the Supreme Court's
case law in this area is a requirement that courts find a
Congressional intent to create a particular federal right ....
In light of this focus [on congressional intent], we reject the
Sixth Circuit's approach-i.e., finding a "federal right" in
any regulation that in its own right meets the three-prong
"federal rights" test. For the same reason, we also reject the
approach labeled "troubling" by the dissent in Wright-i.e.,
finding enforceable rights in any valid administrative
interpretation of a statute that creates some enforceable
. ht .339
rIg
The Eleventh Circuit "conclude[d] [that] federal rights must
ultimately emanate from either explicit or implicit statutory

334.
See South Camden, 274 F.3d at 789-90 (finding the regulations "too far removed
from Congressional intent to constitute a 'federal right' enforceable under § 1983").
335. [d. at 787-88; Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008; see also Mank, South Camden, supra
note 328, at 10475-76 (discussing South Camden); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at
348-49 (discussing Harris).
336. The Harris Court applied a test of whether there was evidence in the statute
that Congress had "unambiguously conferred" upon Medicaid recipients a federal right to
transportation enforceable under § 1983. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1011-12; Recent Cases: Civil
Rights-Availability of a § 1983 Remedy-Eleventh Circuit Holds that Federal
Regulations Requiring State Medicaid Plans to Provide Transportation to and from
Providers Do Not Create a Right Enforceable Under § 1983-Harris v. James, 127 F.3d
993 (11th Cir. 1997), 111 lIARV. L. REV. 2444, 2446 (1998) [hereinafter Recent Cases); see
also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 351 & n.224 (citing the preceding authorities
and noting that the Harris majority found the statute did not pass the test).
337. South Camden, 274 F.3d at 787-88 (concluding that because the regulations at
issue went "beyond explicating the specific content of the statutory provision," they did
not confer a "'federal right' enforceable under § 1983" because "Itlo hold otherwise would
be inconsistent... with the Supreme Court's directive that courts must find that
Congress has unambiguously conferred federal rights on the plaintiff').
338. Refer to text accompanying notes 191-96 supra (highlighting the Gonzaga
majority's rationale for the test).
339. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 348-49
(discussing Harris).
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requirements."34o A regulation may serve as the basis of a § 1983
suit only if there is an appropriate "nexus" between the right in
the regulation and congressional intent to establish an
enforceable federal right in the statute that authorized the
· 341
reguIa t Ion.

C. A Broad Reading of «Fleshing Out" a Statute's Intent
In light of Gonzaga, the argument that regulations alone
may create rights enforceable through § 1983 is probably
untenable because a regulation alone normally cannot provide
"clear" and "unambiguous" evidence that Congress intended to
establish an individual right. 342 However, under Wright and the
Eleventh Circuit's Harris decision there is room for regulations to
explicate or fill in the details of a statute that broadly evinces an
intent to create an individual right. 343 In Harris, the Eleventh
Circuit stated that regulations may not themselves establish
rights, but concluded that regulations could "further define" or
"flesh out" rights that are implicit in the underlying statute. 344
The "fleshing out" approach reflects the reality that agencies
often have the best understanding of what a statute means

340. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009 n.21. In Harris, the Eleventh Circuit held, in a two-toone decision, that a Medicaid regulation purporting to give recipients the right of publicly
funded transportation to and from health·care providers for non-emergency care exceeded
the scope of any rights given by Congress in the underlying statute and, therefore, that
the regulation did not create a federal right enforceable under § 1983. See id. at 1009-12;
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 348, 351; Pettys, supra note 55, at 79-80; Recent
Cases, supra note 336, at 2444-49 (arguing that "[b)y failing to give deference to agency
regulations, Harris forecloses private enforcement of congressionally authorized funding
conditions and thus undermines federal agencies' administration of scores of federal
programs"). The Harris Court held that the transportation regulation did not establish
enforceable rights under § 1983 because it did not "define the content of any specific right
conferred upon the plaintiffs by Congress" because there was no provision in the statute
for non-emergency transportation. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009-10; Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 11, at 351.
341. According to the Eleventh Circuit in Harris, "the nexus between the regulation
and Congressional intent to create federal rights [was] simply too tenuous to create an
enforceable right to transportation." Harris, 127 F.3d at 1010. Even assuming arguendo
that the transportation regulation was a "valid interpretation" of the statute and might
give rise to "some federal right," the Harris Court maintained that even those two
assumptions were insufficient to establish an enforceable federal right to transportation
for the plaintiffs under § 1983 because such a right must have a substantial nexus or
basis in the statute, but the statute did not create any such right. [d. at 1010 n.23, 1011 &
n.27 ("We assume for the sake of argument only that these provisions create some federal
right."). For discussion, see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 348-51, and
Recent Cases, supra note 336, at 2446.
342. Refer to note 304 supra and accompanying text.
343. Refer to notes 304-05 supra and accompanying text.
344. See Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 348-53. Refer to note 303 supra and
accompanying text.
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because they often help Congress write the statutes they will be
in charge ofimplementing. 345
In Doe v. Chiles,346 the Eleventh Circuit applied Harris's
"fleshing out" standard in concluding that certain Medicaid
regulations "further define[d] the contours of a statutory right"
and determined that the statute "as further fleshed out by the[]
regulations-creates [a] federal right.,,347 The court in Doe
initially found that the statute created a right, but also
considered the regulations in combination with the statute to
define a "federal right" that was enforceable through § 1983. 348
Similarly, the Hawaii District Court in Makin ex rel. Russell v.
Hawaii 349 found that a provision in the federal Medicaid statute
requiring that assistance under the Act "shall be furnished with
reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals" was silent on
what exact time period constituted an "unreasonable period."350
However, other statutory provisions and especially applicable
federal regulations made it clear that states could set population
limits on the numbers eligible for services to help the mentally
retarded, that persons on the waiting list were not entitled to
demand reasonably prompt services, and therefore that persons
on the waiting list were not intended beneficiaries of the statute
entitled to sue under § 1983. 351 Accordingly, the Court observed:
"Fortunately, the agency regulations clear up any ambiguity or
doubt that the statute may have created."352 Both Doe and Makin
appropriately considered the federal agency's implementing
regulations in defining the scope of the rights in the complex
federal Medicaid statute.
While Gonzaga probably is inconsistent with using
regulations alone to define rights enforceable under § 1983,
because regulations by themselves cannot supply the necessary
congressional intent, Gonzaga is compatible with an approach
that initially considers whether a statute demonstrates that
Congress intended to establish an individual right and then looks
to the regulations to define the scope of that right as the Court
did in Wright. While the three Wright dissenters who remain on
the Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and
345. Refer to note 304 supra and accompanying text.
346.
136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998).
347. [d. at 717; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 352-53.
348.
Doe, 136 F.3d at 716-17; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 352-53.
349.
114 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Haw. 1999).
350.
[d. at 1021, 1025-27 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(S».
351.
[d. at 1027-28, 1030-31 (discussing limitations on population size in 42 C.F.R.
§ 441.303(6)).
352.
[d. at 1027.
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Scalia-formed the nucleus of the Gonzaga majority, the
Gonzaga decision clearly does not·· overrule Wright.353
Furthermore, in Suter, the Court examined the relevant
regulations in deciding whether the state had notice that its plan
created enforceable rights under § 1983. 354 Under Wright and the
Eleventh Circuit's Harris decision, courts may use agency
regulations to clarify and define the scope of rights as long as the
rights are first established by Congress in a statute. 355
VI. TEXTUALISM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND § 1983

While it primarily focused on textual evidence, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's Gonzaga opinion considered legislative
history356 and, therefore, the Court's decision implies that
lower courts may evaluate such evidence when they try to
ascertain congressional intent. Courts have traditionally
considered a statute's legislative history in either determining
whether a statute creates an individual right enforceable
under § 1983 or whether a statute's remedies are so
comprehensive that they preclude a § 1983 action. 357 For
353.
Refer to text accompanying notes 192-96 supra (explaining how Chief Justice
Rehnquist justified Gonzaga in light of Wright and Wilder).
354. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 361-63 (1992). Refer to text accompanying
note 327 supra.
355.
Refer to text accompanying note 300 supra (noting the Eleventh Circuit's
conclusion that regulations alone may not establish rights but may "further define" or
"flesh out" rights implicit in the underlying statute), and text accompanying note 328
supra (quoting the Wright majority's statement that regulations defining statutory
concepts have the "force oflaw").
Refer to note 20 supra and accompanying text (noting that despite a highly
356.
textual analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist in Gonzaga did briefly consider one aspect of the
statute's legislative history).
357. See, e.g., Pa. Pharmacists Ass'n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 540-41 (3d Cir.
2002) (en banc) (''We have examined the legislative history of Section 30(A) and have
found nothing inconsistent with our reading of the statutory language."), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 100 (2002); Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749, 757 (2d Cir.
1998) (concluding from legislative history that Title IX's remedies precluded § 1983 suit);
W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 21 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The legislative history
of [§] 1396a(a)(13)(A) buttresses our conclusion that WVUH has a private right to enforce
the federal hospital reimbursement standard."), affd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 83
(1991); Prestera Ctr. for Mental Health Servs., Inc. v. Lawton, 111 F. Supp. 2d 768, 776
(S.D. W. Va. 2000) (discussing legislative history of the Medicaid statute in determining
service providers are not intended beneficiaries); Ottis v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 182, 18687 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (discussing the legislative history of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 in determining whether 42 U.s.C. § 1396r(h)(2), nursing home
reform law, is enforceable by residents of nursing homes under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); N.Y.
Airlines, Inc. v. Dukes County, 623 F. Supp. 1435, 1446-47 (D. Mass. 1985) ("The
legislative history therefore indicates that Congress in enacting [49 U.S.C. § 2210(a)]
intended to benefit air carriers by imposing the requirement on airport operators that
carriers be subject to nondiscriminatory and substantially comparable treatment.");
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 373-75 (discussing the legislative histories of Title
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example, both the majority opinion358 and Justice O'Connor's
dissenting opinion359 in Wright considered both the HUD
statute and its legislative history in assessing whether
Congress intended to include a utility allowance within the
definition of "rent." The Wilder decision relied heavily on
legislative history in concluding that health care providers had
a right to sue participating states. 360 Additionally, the Supreme
Court in both the Sea Clammers 361 and Smith v. Robinson 362
decisions recognized that legislative history could be important
in deciding whether Congress intended a statute's remedies to
be so comprehensive that they preclude a separate suit under
§ 1983.
There is a certain irony about the relationships among the
issues of textualism, legislative history, and enforcing statutory
rights through § 1983. Initially, proponents of using § 1983 to
enforce statutory rights focused on the "plain meaning" of
§ 1983's phrase "and laws.,,363 Justice White's concurring opinion
in Chapman 364 and Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Thiboutot focused on the textual meaning of the 1874 addition. 365
By contrast, Justice Powell's concurrence in Chapman and his
dissent in Thiboutot, both of which Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist joined, focused more on legislative history and
policy.366 In Pennhurst, then-Justice Rehnquist carefully reviewed
VI and Title IX to determine if they preclude § 1983 suits).
358. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 424-30
(1987) (concluding from statute and legislative history that Congress did not intend
housing statute's remedies to preclude § 1983 suit); Frye, supra note 129, at 1183, 1197
n.178 (discussing use oflegislative history in Wright).
359.
Wright, 470 U.S. at 434 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Key, supra note 29, at 330
(discussing Justice O'Connor's use oflegislative history in the Wright dissent).
360.
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 505-07, 515 & n.13 (1990); Frye, supra
note 129, at 1187, 1197 n.178 (discussing use oflegislative history in Wilder).
361. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'] Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
13 (1981) ("We look first, of course, to the statutory language .... Then we review the
legislative history and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to determine
congressional intent.").
362.
See 468 U.S. 992, 1005-13 (1984) ("Both the provisions of the statute and its
legislative history indicate that Congress intended handicapped children with
constitutional claims to a free appropriate public education to pursue those claims
through the carefully tailored administrative and judicial mechanism set out in the
statute.").
363.
Refer to Part lILA supra (discussing various interpretations of § 1983's "and
laws").
364.
Refer to notes 73-80 supra and accompanying text (discussing Justice White's
concurring opinion in Chapman).
365.
Refer to notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Thiboutot).
366.
Refer to notes 75-80, 85-95 supra and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Powell's opinions in Chapman and Thiboutot).
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the statute's legislative history.367 More recently, however, the
opponents of using § 1983 to enforce statutory rights, including
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas, have emphasized .a textualist reading of the
statutes. 36B On the other hand; Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer have often examined legislative history
· argument s. 369
an d po1ICY
In his concurring opinion in Gonzaga, Justice Breyer
criticized the majority's view that a right may be enforceable
through § 1983 "only if set forth 'unambiguously' iii the statute's
'text and structure."mQ Justice Breyer may have overstated the
extent to which Gonzaga relied on a textualist approach.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion primarily
focused on the "text and structure" of FERPA, 371 his opinion did
consider legislative history indicating that Congress did not want
"'multiple interpretations'" of the statute by regional federal
officials and, therefore, centralized decisionmaking in the
Secretary of Education's office. 372 Despite a textualist tilt,
Gonzaga does not prohibit courts from considering a statute's
legislative history.
A. Textualism and Arguments For and Against Legislative History
Textualist judges generally attempt to ground the
interpretation of a statute on its textual language alone. 373
Textualists usually refuse to consider the broader congressional
367. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1981).
368. Refer to Parts III.E and IV.A supra (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinions in Suter and Gonzaga, in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas joined).
369. Refer to Part IV.B-.C supra (discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion,
joined by Justice Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Souter, in Gonzaga University v. Doe).
370. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2279 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting id. at 2273, 2278).
371. See id. at 2278.
Id. at 2279 (quoting 120 CONGo REC. 39,863 (1974) (joint statement) (expressing
372.
"concern that regionalizing the enforcement of [FERPA) may lead to multiple
interpretations of it, and possibly work a hardship on parents, students, and
institutions").
See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
373.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 180-81 (1999) (observing that textualists focus on "ordinary
meaning" of text, and criticizing textualists for ignoring the possibility of multiple textual
meanings); Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing
Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 4) !hereinafter
Mank, Legal Context); Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, 1235-37; Roger Colinvaux, Note,
What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good Judging Under a Textualist Lens, 72
IND. L.J. 1133, 1133 (1997) (same). See generally POPKIN, supra, at 157-85 (discussing
textualism).
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intent or purposes behind a statute because of the danger that
judges will misuse such broad evidence to fit their political
agendas. 374 Additionally, textualists frequently contend that it is
misleading to infer that Congress as a whole has a clear single
purpose or intent behind legislation when most statutes are the
375
result of compromises among legislators with different goals.
Furthermore, textualists often argue that the Constitution's
Presentment Clause demands that judges examine only the text
of a statute because it alone has been approved by two houses of
Congress ana submitted for Presidential signature or veto. 376
Accordingly, textualists normally decline to consider a statute's
legislative history because it has not been submitted for
Presidential approval, and often represents the views of a small
percentage of legislators. 377
Many commentators and. judges have criticized the
textualist approach to statutory interpretation. They often
374.
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAw 16-23 (1997) (arguing that judges should look for statutory meaning in statute's text
and not seek elusive "intent" or purpose of the legislature); see also Mank, Legal Context,
supra note 373 (manuscript at 7); Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1237; William D.
Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1135-36 (1992) (discussing Justice Scalia's skepticism in
determining legislative intent); George H. Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV.
321, 330-32 (1995) (discussing the recent judicial trend toward legal textualism);
Colinvaux, supra note 373, at 1149 n.69.
375.
See POPKIN, supra note 373, at 166-67 (discussing Judge Easterbrook's theory
that it is impossible to determine legislative intent because most legislation is based on a
variety of public and private motives); William W. Buzbee, The One· Congress Fiction in
Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 230 n.212 (2000) (observing that Judge
Easterbrook has pointed out difficulty in determining the intent of collective bodies);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) ("Because
legislatures comprise many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'designs,' hidden yet
discoverable."); Mank, Legal Context, supra note 373 (manuscript at 4).
376.
See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (Scalia,
J.) (arguing that under the Constitution the text of a statute is the only relevant
consideration); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(same); see also Mank, Legal Context, supra note 373 (manuscript at 7) (discussing the
textualist theory that the Presentment Clause limits judges to a statute's text); John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70-77 (2001)
!hereinafter Manning, Textualisml (discussing textualists' view that judges should only
consider a statute's text because it alone is presented to the President for signature or
veto); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1300-01 (1990)
(same); cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 927-28 (1983) (holding that a one-house
legislative veto violates the requirements of bicameralism and presentment in Article I).
But see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 230-32 (1994)
(criticizing the textualist presentment theory and arguing that the Constitution does not
prohibit judges from considering legislative history).
377.
See SCALIA, supra note 374, at 29-37 (arguing that legislative history often
represents the views of only a tiny minority of Congress); Buzbee, supra note 375, at 22223, 230 n.212 (same); Mank, Legal Context, supra note 373 (manuscript at 7).
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contend that judges should examine a statute's legislative
history because it is essential to evaluate Congress's intent or
purposes in enacting a statutory provision. 378 Additionally,
Congress generally expects judges to consider legislative
history relating to a statute's intent and purposes. 379
Accordingly, by examining only the language of a statute,
textualist judges are likely in many cases to ignore Congress's
true intent or purposes in enacting a statute. 380 Notably, there
is some empirical evidence supporting Justice Stevens's
argument that Congress is somewhat more likely to reject
Supreme Court decisions relying on textualist interpretation,
although the number of these cases is relatively small. 381 The
most probable explanation for this empirical data is that
Congress is more likely to disagree with a court's
interpretation of a statute when the judge fails to consider
external evidence such as legislative history about a statute's
· ten t or goa1s. 382
III

378. See Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1240-41 (arguing that Congress
expects judges to consider legislative history and evidence other than just the text); Mank,
Legal Context, supra note 373 (manuscript at 8-10); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge
Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 386 (same); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 309 (1990) (same).
379. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 13, 23-24
(1995) (arguing that textualism ignores congressional expectations); Mank, Legal Context,
supra note 373 (manuscript at 8 & n.68).
380.
See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Court uses the implements of literalism to wound,
rather than to minister to, congressional intent"); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism
Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act
Interpretation, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 204 (1992); Mank, Textualist, supra note
304, at 1241, 1273 (discussing whether textualist decisions are more likely to be rejected
by Congress); Mank, Legal Context, supra note 373 (manuscript at 8-9).
381.
See West Virginia University Hospitals, 499 U.S. at 113-15 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress is more likely to pass legislation overriding textualist
interpretations of statutes, and that textualist interpretation is often inconsistent with
how Congress intends courts to read statutes); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretations, 101 YALE L.J. 331, app. III at 450-55 (1991)
(demonstrating by a review of overridden cases that Congress is more likely to enact
legislation rejecting Supreme Court decisions based on textualism); Mank, Textualist,
supra note 304, at 1241, 1273 (discussing whether textualist decisions are more likely to
be rejected by Congress); Mank, Legal Context, supra note 373 (manuscript at 10);
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 448-51 (1992) (providing
statistical data indicating that Congress more frequently overrides the Supreme Court's
decisions using "plain meaning" interpretation, based on fifty-six overridden' Court
decisions).
382.
See Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1241, 1273 (discussing whether
textualist decisions are more likely to be rejected by Congress); Mank, Legal Context,
supra note 373 (manuscript at 10).
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B. Why Textualism in Gonzaga
Justices Scalia and Thomas are the only two members of the
Supreme Court who generally adhere to textualism. 383 In
particular, Justice Scalia is the leading proponent of textualism
on the Court and will frequently file a concurring opinion if the
majority opinion addresses a statute's legislative history.384 The
other Justices on the Court are still willing to consider legislative
history.38s However, to win the votes of Justice Scalia or Thomas,
or to avoid a concurring opinion by one or both, other Justices
will sometimes omit discussion of legislative history if they can
do so without serious harm to the integrity of their opinion. 386
383. See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434, 462 & n.2 (1999) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(employing the textualist approach); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54
(1992) (Thomas, J.) ("We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.
When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:
'judicial inquiry is complete.'" (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)
(citations omitted))); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of
Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 226 & n.22; Manning, Textualism, supra note 376, at
4 n.5 (stating that Justices Scalia and Thomas are the Court's consistent textualists);
Mank, Legal Context, supra note 373 (manuscript at 8); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's
Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties,
Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 Ky. L.J. 527, 532-33 (1998)
[hereinafter Mank, Canons] (same); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.U. L.Q. 351 (1994) (stating that Justice Thomas generally
agrees with Justice Scalia's textualist approach to interpretation).
384. See Mank, Legal Context, supra note 373; Mank, Canons, supra note 383, at
533.
385. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (responding to
a concurring opinion by Justice Scalia attacking the use of legislative history, Justice
White, joined by every member of Supreme Court except Justice Scalia, briefly defended
consideration of legislative history in "good-faith effort to discern legislative intent");
Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1268; Mank, Canons, supra note 383, at 533; Merrill,
supra note 383, at 363-65 (observing that the majority of Supreme Court Justices are
willing to consider legislative history); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the
Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383,383
(1992); Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory
Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235, 263-64, 283 (stating that the majority of the Supreme
Court continues to consider legislative history despite Justice Scalia's criticisms).
386. See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In
Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 398 (1996); Mank, Textualist, supra note
304, at 1268; Mank, Canons, supra note 383, at 533; Merrill, supra note 383, at 365-66;
Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 205, 217 (observing that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor
sometimes avoid discussion of legislative history to win support of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, and that such efforts were especially common during the early 1990s). However,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy at times are willing to
rely on legislative history even if that means disagreeing with Justices Thomas or Scalia.
See Tiefer, supra, at 244-45 (same). For example, in Department of Commerce v. United
States House of Representatives, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, which was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, relied on silence in the legislative history
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This may explain why Chief Justice Rehnquist's Gonzaga opinion
largely focused on FERPA's "text and structure.,,3S7 By contrast,
in his 1981 opinion in Pennhurst, then-Justice Rehnquist had
extensively discussed the statute's legislative history,388 but that
was before Justice Scalia joined the Court. Yet Gonzaga does
refer to evidence from the Congressional Record that Congress
wanted to avoid multiple interpretations of FERPA by regional
Department of Education officials. 3s9 While it leans toward
textualism, Gonzaga did not prohibit judges from considering
legislative history when they ascertain what was Congress's
intent in enacting a particular statute.

C.

In Determining Whether Congress Intended to Create a Right
Under § 1983, Courts Should Examine a Statute's Legislative
History and Not Just Its Text.

The Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("IDEA"),390
which provides funding to states on the condition that they
provide individually tailored educational services to every
student with a disability,391 provides an excellent example of the
importance of legislative history in determining whether a
statute allows a remedy under § 1983. An important question is
whether parents who are dissatisfied with their child's
individualized education plan may sue states under § 1983. In
Smith v. Robinson,392 the plaintiffs sued directly under IDEA's
predecessor statute, the Education for All Handicapped Children
despite strong disagreement in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Thomas. 525 U.S. 316, 342-43 (1999). Similarly, in United States v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co., Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined Justice Souter's opinion
despite strong disagreement by Justices Thomas and Scalia. 504 U.S. 505, 506, 519-21
(1992).
387. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2278 (2002).
388. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1981).
389. Gonzaga, 122 S. Ct. at 2279 (quoting 120 CONGo REC. 39,863 (1974) (joint
statement) (expressing "concern that regionalizing the enforcement of [FERPA] may lead
to multiple interpretations of it, and possibly work a hardship on parents, students, and
institutions"».
390. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1419 (2000).
391.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(I)(A) (stating that a student has the right to appropriate
education at public expense); id. § 1412(a)(1) (stating that a condition ofreceiving federal
funds is state provision of free public education for all children with disabilities between
the ages of three and twenty-one); Jean M. Bond, Making Up for Lost Time: The Third
Circuit's Use of Remedies for Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
46 VILL. L. REV. 777, 777, 781-84 (2001) (discussing the IDEA); Terry Jean Seligmann, A
Diller, a Dollar: Section 1983 Damage Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L.
REV. 465, 468 & n.ll (2002) (same); Stephen C. Shannon, Note, The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act: Determining "Appropriate Relief' in a Post·Gwinnett Era, 85
VA. L. REV. 853, 855-56 (1999) (same).
392. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
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Act ("EHA"),393 and under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment through § 1983. 394 They
used § 1983 only to enforce constitutional remedies and not any
statutory rights. 395 The Court held that the extensive remedies
available under the ERA precluded constitutional claims under
§ 1983. 396 The Court observed that the EHA statute provided "an
elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of
handicapped children.,,397 The Court reasoned that Congress, by
enacting a statutory remedy that is essentially identical to the
constitutional remedy, must have intended to preclude a
constitutional claim under § 1983. 398 Additionally, the Court
implied that § 1983 could not be used to enforce the EHA when it
stated that "[c]ourts generally agree that the EHA may not be
claimed as the basis for a § 1983 action.,,399
Two years after Smith, Congress amended the ERA by
enacting the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986
(HCPA).400 Section 1415(f), which is now renumbered as § 1415(1),
stated: "Nothing in this title [currently chapter] shall be
construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies
available under the Constitution . . . or other Federal statutes
[currently laws] protecting the rights of handicapped children
and youth [currently children with disabilities] .... "401 Section
393. See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1419); Seligmann, supra note 391, at 468 n.10; Shannon, supra note 391, at 853.
394. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 994; Shannon, supra note 391, at 857-58. The plaintiffs
also raised state law claims that are beyond the scope of this Article. See Smith, 468 U.S.
at 995-1000 (discussing the procedural history).
395. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1004-05 ("In this case, petitioners made no effort to enlarge
the remedies available under the ERA by asserting their claim through the 'and laws'
provision of § 1983. They presented separate constitutional claims, properly cognizable
under § 1983.").
396. Id. at 1009-13; Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Can Section 1983 Be Used to Redress
Violations of the IDEA?, EDUC. L. REP., Mar. 28, 2002, at 21, 24 (discussing the Smith
holding).
397. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1010-11.
398. See id. at 1009-13; see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 371-72, 376.
399. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1008 n.11.
400.
Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)
(applying to attorneys' fees) and § 1415(1) (regarding the availability of other statutory
remedies); see also Seligmann, supra note 391, at 468 n.16.
401. Pub. L. No. 99-372, § 3(0, 100 'Stat. 1145 (originally 20 U.S.C. § 1415(0, now
codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1)); see also Bond, supra note 391, at 791 n.94.
The IDEA Amendments of 1997 replaced § 1415(0 with a nearly identical provision,
§ 1415(1). See IDEA Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, §§ 101, 615(1), 111 Stat. 37,
98; Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 621 n.19 (7th Cir. 1997). The main purpose of the
1997 amendment was to clarify that the statute does not preclude the pursuit of remedies
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 530 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1998). Additionally, while § 1415(0 referred to "Federal statutes," § 1415(1) refers to
"Federal laws." Id. at 530 & n.4. This Article will refer to all citations of § 1415(f) in pre-
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1415(1) does not explicitly refer to suits ..under § 1983, although
its language could be construed to . authorize them. 402 The
legislative history is more explicit concerning § 1983 suits. The
Amendment's House Conference Report explained that
Congress's goal in HCPA was to amend the ERA to explicitly
authorize attorneys' fees and to demonstrate that the ERA does
not bar other statutory remedies as long as a plaintiff first
exhausts her administrative due process remedies under the
statute. 403 Criticizing the Smith decision, the Senate Report
states that Congress's "original intent" when it first enacted the
ERA was to allow the "right to litigation.,,404 While HCPA does
not explicitly refer to § 1983, the House Conference Report
clearly states that Congress intended HCPA to apply to "actions
brought under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983.,,405 Neither the amendments
nor the legislative history directly address whether § 1983 suits
may include damages. 406 In 1990, the EHA was renamed the
IDEA. 407
Courts have disagreed about whether the HCPA
amendments, including their legislative history, clearly
demonstrate that Congress intended the IDEA to establish rights
enforceable through § 1983. 408 Because the amendments to IDEA
do not explicitly address the issue, some courts refuse to allow
409
§ 1983 claims to enforce the IDEA. The Fourth Circuit has
interpreted the text and legislative history of HCPA to allow only

1997 decisions as references to § 1415(1).
402.
See § 1415(1).
403.
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5, 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1807, 1807, 1809; Elizabeth Malloy, Division Among the Circuits: Are Section 1983
Damages Available for Violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act?
(draft July 2002) (manuscript at 11-12, on file with the Houston Law Review); Seligmann,
supra note 392, at 468, 504, 521-26 (discussing IDEA's requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies).
404.
See S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1799;
Malloy, supra note 403 (manuscript at 11-12); Seligmann, supra note 392, at 504.
405. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-687, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807,
1809.
406.
See Malloy, supra note 403 (manuscript at 12); Osborne, supra note 396, at 2432 (discussing several cases allowing or rejecting § 1983 claims under IDEA).
407.
See Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610,612 (7th Cir. 1997); Seligmann, supra note
392, at 468 n.10 (stating that the IDEA is equivalent to its predecessor statute, ERA).
408.
See Osborne, supra note 396, at 24-32 (discussing several cases allowing or
rejecting § 1983 claims under IDEA); Seligmann, supra note, at 392, 496-98; Shannon,
supra note 391, at 864-74 (discussing cases addressing whether implied right of action or
§ 1983 suits are available under § 1983).
409.
E.g., Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No.1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 2000)
(concluding that Smith v. Robinson's determination that IDEA's remedies are
comprehensive still prohibits § 1983 suits under IDEA); Malloy, supra note 403
(manuscript at 14) (citing Padilla); Osborne, supra note 396, at 30 (discussing Padilla).
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constitutional claims under § 1983 in light of Pennhurst's
requirement that Spending Clause statutes may impose liability
on states only if the conditions are clearly stated. 410 Other courts
allow § 1983 suits, but prohibit money damage awards. 411 Finally,
some courts, most notably the Third Circuit, have interpreted
§ 1415(1) and HCPA's legislative history to allow suits under
§ 1983, including the possibility of damages. 412 The Seventh
Circuit has held that infants with disabilities may bring a class
action suit under § 1983 alleging that a state has not complied
with the early intervention requirements of the IDEA, concluding
that § 1415(1) demonstrates Congress's intent that § 1983 suits
should be available to beneficiaries of the IDEA and that Part H
of the IDEA,413 which applies to disabled infants, is governed by
§ 1415(1), even though the former does not mention the latter. 414
The IDEA and its HCPA amendments present an excellent
example of the importance of legislative history as evidence
concerning congressional intent.415 Nothing in Gonzaga prohibits
courts from considering HCPA's legislative history in
determining whether the HCPA amendments allow § 1983 suits,
including those for damages. 416 Just as Chief Justice Rehnquist's
410. See Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 531-32 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. V. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)); Bond, supra note 391, at 792
(discussing Sellers); Osborne, supra note 396, at 29-30 (same); Seligmann, supra note
392, at 500-01,516 & n.257 (same); Shannon, supra note 391, at 872-74 (same).
411. See, e.g., Heidemann V. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996); Crocker V.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 386-87 (6th Cir. 1992); Malloy, supra
note 403, at 14; Osborne, supra note 396, at 26, 29 (discussing Crocker and Heidemann);
Seligmann, supra note 392, at 502.
412.
See, e.g., W.B. V. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995) (relying on legislative
history in determining that 1986 HCPA Amendments authorize § 1983 suits under
IDEA); Goleta Union Elementary Sch. Dist. V. Ordway, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292-95
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (following Matula's holding that legislative history of § 1415(f) makes
clear Congress made the statute enforceable through § 1983); Zearley V. Ackerman, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.D.C. 2000); Butler V. S. Glens Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 106 F. Supp. 2d
414, 420 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Cappillino v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F. Supp. 2d 513,
515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Emma C. v. Eastin, 985 F. Supp. 940, 947 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Bond,
supra note 391, at 791-92; Malloy, supra note 403, at 14, 23-26; Osborne, supra note 396,
at 24-29 (discussing cases allowing § 1983 suits under IDEA); Seligmann, supra note 392,
at 501; Shannon, supra note 391, at 867-70 (discussing Matula); see also Mrs. W. V.
Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987) (considering legislative history in holding that
§ 1983 is available for violations under pre-HCPA version ofIDEA).
413.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1485 (2000).
414.
See Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 619-21 (7th Cir. 1997).
415.
See Seligmann, supra note 392, at 502-06, 536 (discussing the legislative
history of IDEA and arguing that the statute does not clearly establish rights enforceable
by § 1983).
416. Whether HCPA's legislative history in conjunction with the 1986 Amendments
is sufficient to establish an individual right is beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Malloy, supra note 403 (arguing that HCPA Amendments authorize § 1983 suits
under IDEA).
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Gonzaga opinion considered FERPA's legislative history relating
to Congress's concern that "multiple interpretations" would
result if regional federal officials were allowed to interpret the
statute,417 lower courts should routinely consider a statute's
legislative history as one factor in ascertaining congressional
intent about whether it creates individual rights, because
considering a wider range of evidence is usually better.418
While legislative history provides valuable evidence and
should be considered by courts, one must acknowledge that
courts will sometimes disagree about the interpretation of
legislative history. For example, courts have disagreed about
whether the HCPA amendments authorize § 1983 claims under
the IDEA.419 Similarly, before the Supreme Court's Blessing
decision decided that there was no right for parents to sue states
by § 1983 for the states' alleged failure to provide child support
enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act,420 the courts of appeals disagreed in reading the statute's
legislative history about whether Congress intended to make
parents beneficiaries ofthe statute. 421
Like other types of evidence, courts need to assess the
reliability and the relevance of any legislative history.422 If the
text of the statute has a clear meaning, courts generally will not
423
use legislative history to contradict the text's plain meaning.
417. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2279 (2002) (quoting 120 CONGo REC.
39,863 (1974) (joint statement) (expressing "concern that regionalizing the enforcement of
[FERPA] may lead to multiple interpretations of it, and possibly work a hardship on
parents, students, and institutions")).
418. See Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1275 (arguing that use of legislative
history is likely to increase the odds that a court can find evidence regarding a specific
issue relative to just considering text); Merrill, supra note 383, at 366-70 (same);
Slawson, supra note 385, at 400 (same).
419.
See Seligmann, supra note 392, at 502-06. Refer to notes 408-14 supra and
accompanying text (comparing courts that allow these § 1983 claims with courts that do
not).
420. Blessing V. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 332, 342-46 (1997) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 651-669b).
421.
Compare Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding
that there is no right to sue under § 1983 because Title IV-D does not make families with
children beneficiaries of the statute, based in part on a reading of the statute's legislative
history), with Carelli v. Howser, 923 F.2d 1208, 1211 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that there is
a right to sue under § 1983 because Title IV-D, in light of legislative history, intends to
make families with children beneficiaries of the statute). See generally Ashish Prasad,
Comment, Rights Without Remedies: Section 1983 Enforcement of Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 197 (1993) (arguing that Title IV-D creates enforceable
rights but does not provide a comprehensive remedial scheme).
422. See Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1267-75 (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of considering legislative history); Merrill, supra note 383, at 366-70
(same); Slawson, supra note 385, at 400 (same).
423. Almost all scholars acknowledge "that the statutory text is the most
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However, a statute's text is often ambiguous, and in those cases
it is appropriate for courts to consider legislative history. Some
types of legislative his'tory are considered more reliable than
others. For example, most judges generally give more weight to
official conference reports or reports of the House or Senate than
to remarks by individuallegislators. 424
Despite Justice Breyer's suggestion that the majority
opinion relied only on FERPA's text and structure to determine if
there was clear and unambiguous evidence of congressional
intent to create a right, Gonzaga does not prohibit judges from
considering legislative history, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion did in fact consider such evidence. 425 As they
have done in the past, judges should continue to consider
legislative history when they interpret a statute's meaning and
Congress's intent in enacting the statute. In particular, courts
are more likely to find congressional intent about whether a
statute creates individual rights by examining a statute's
legislative history. 426 By failing to consider legislative history,
judges are more likely to miss Congress's intent to benefit
individuals.
VII. CONCLUSION

The Gonzaga decision will significantly harm the intended
beneficiaries of federal grant-in-aid programs that give
substantial federal aid to state agencies and institutions on the
condition that they provide benefits and rights to individuals. 427
While states are free not to participate in such programs, states
are supposed to be bound by various conditions in exchange for
authoritative interpretive criterion." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354 (1990); see
Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1239-40. Nevertheless, courts sometimes reject
statutory language that would lead to "an odd result" and instead rely on legislative
history. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (quoting Green v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989)); see Mank, Textualist, supra note 304,
at 1275 & n.237; Slawson, supra note 385, at 396, 400. But see Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at
473 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that courts should follow statutory text unless
interpretation produces an "absurd" result).
424.
See Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1269 (noting, however, that "some
textualists allege that legislators rarely read committee reports").
425.
Refer to Part IV.A supra (di~cussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's Gonzaga
opinion).
426.
See Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1275 (arguing that use of legislative
history is likely to increase the odds a court can find evidence regarding a specific issue
relative to just considering text); Merrill, supra note 383, at 366-70 (same); Slawson,
supra note 385, at 400 (same).
427.
See Key, supra note 29, at 284, 287-93 (discussing the role of federal grant-inaid programs).
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receiving federal aid. 428 In the past, courts often implied private
rights of action to protect individuals who were harmed when
states violated the conditions of their grant-in-aid programs, but
the Supreme Court has largely eliminated implied private causes
of action by demanding proof that Congress intended to provide
both a right and a remedy to the individuals. 429 In response, many
plaintiffs have sought to vindicate federal statutory rights
through § 1983, which may provide a remedy even if the
substantive right itself contains no right of action. 430
Unfortunately, Gonzaga shuts the § 1983 door not only for
students who sought to challenge allegedly wrongful decisions by
educational institutions, but likely for most intended
beneficiaries of other federal grant-in-aid programs.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's requirement of clear and
unambiguous proof that Congress intended to establish an
individual right on behalf of a class including the plaintiff eroded
the Court's precedent emphasizing the presumptive enforcement
of federal statutory rights through § 1983. Even worse, the
majority opinion placed an additional burden on the plaintiffs by
effectively demanding proof that Congress would have wanted
thousands of private suits, even though the majority
acknowledged that in a § 1983 suit the plaintiff does not have to
prove that Congress intended to create a cause of action because
§ 1983 supplies its own cause of action for the intended
beneficiaries of a federal statutory right. 431 By blurring the right
versus
remedy
distinction,
Chief Justice
Rehnquist
inappropriately considered evidence about whether the statute's
remedies should preclude the enforcement of rights under § 1983
to address the separate issue of whether Congress intended to
create an individual remedy under FERPA, and placed a far
heavier burden on the plaintiffs by doing SO.432 The defendants
should have had the burden of proving that FERPA's centralized
administrative review procedures preclude suits under § 1983,
but Gonzaga placed the effective burden on the plaintiffs. 433

428. [d. at 284.
429. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732-35 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(discussing the history of Supreme Court decisions allowing or denying private rights of
action); Key, supra note 29, at 294; Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 29, at 2526; Stabile, supra note 29, at 868-71.
430.
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 11, at 357-59.
431.
Refer to Part IV.A supra (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's Gonzaga
opinion).
432.
[d.
433.
[d.
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Yet Gonzaga is not necessarily a total disaster for civil rights
plaintiffs because it did not overrule Wilder, Wright, or Blessing.
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's focus on textual evidence,
lower courts in good faith can still consider evidence regarding
legislative history. Furthermore, while regulations alone may not
establish the necessary intent, regulations can still define the
scope of a right that is clearly established in a statute, especially
because federal agencies often have unique insight regarding
statutes they helped Congress draft. 434 By considering agency
regulations and legislative history, courts are less likely to miss
evidence that Congress intended to establish individual rights
that in turn are presumptively enforceable under § 1983.

434. Mank, Textualist, supra note 304, at 1283. Refer to Part V supra (discussing
enforcement of regulations through § 1983).
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